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 1 
1 Introduction 
 
Interlanguage pragmatics is a linguistic area which belongs to the second language 
studies domain. One of its aims is to study non-native speakers’ comprehension and 
production of speech acts in a second language.  
Language learners need to acquire L2 pragmatic competence in order to be able to 
communicate successfully in that language. However, research in interlanguage 
pragmatics has shown that sociolinguistic competence can be problematic for 
language learners. They may be grammatically competent in L2, but still lack 
knowledge of sociolinguistic rules to communicate appropriately and to understand 
language in context. Given that a learner’s first and second languages may differ in 
realizations of speech acts, the lack of linguistic, social and pragmatic knowledge 
may cause the learner to make pragmatic failure. One potential cause of pragmatic 
failure is pragmatic transfer, which occurs when speakers apply rules from the first 
language and culture to their second language. As a consequence, the speaker may 
appear as unintentionally rude, disrespectful and impolite. 
One speech act in which pragmatic transfer can possibly occur is the speech act of 
apologizing. Learning to apologize appropriately in L2 is an important part of the 
speaker’s communicative competence. When social norms are violated and 
miscommunication occurs, apologies are there as an opportunity to save face in the 
face-threatening situation.  
The present thesis investigates the speech act of apologizing with reference to the 
phenomena of politeness and pragmatic transfer. It is structured in seven chapters. 
The first two chapters introduce pragmatics and offer an overview of main linguistic 
fields in the domain of pragmatics. Chapter 4 deals with the concept of language 
competence and explains the process and the types of pragmatic transfer. Chapter 5 
offers insight into the concept of politeness and looks into both traditional and 
modern politeness theories. Its main focus is Brown and Levinson’s Politeness 
Theory and the concept of face. Austin’s and Searle’s speech act theories and 
indirect speech acts are the subject of chapter 6. The speech act of apology and 
strategies for its realization are introduced in chapter 7. The final chapter presents 
the empirical study aimed at analysing the realization of apology strategies by 
Serbian learners of English. It investigates to what extent language learners transfer 
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socio-cultural rules from first to second language, and tries to discover differences 
and similarities between native and non-native English speakers’ production of 
apologies.  
 3 
2 Pragmatics  
 
2.1 Defining pragmatics 
 
Pragmatics is considered a relatively young discipline, which began to develop as a 
separate area of linguistics about forty years ago. The term pragmatics dates back to 
the philosopher Pierce (1905), whose field of interest was pragmatism. But it was 
Charles Morris (1938) who first identified pragmatics as a research area, and 
presented it as a complementary branch to syntax and semantics. Even though 
Morris’ ambitious plan was to integrate language, art and other sciences which deal 
with signs, he never succeeded in that. However, he started a significant interest in 
pragmatic research. 
In his work on pragmatics, Jacob Mey (1994: 245) argues that Rudolf Carnap’s 
approach to pragmatics deserves more to be quoted today than Morris’ work, which 
he finds “rather bland and programmatic”. Here is how Carnap sees pragmatics: 
Linguistics, in the widest sense, is that branch of science which contains all 
empirical investigation concerning languages. It is the descriptive, empirical 
part of semiotic (of spoken or written languages); hence it consists of 
pragmatics, semantics, and descriptive syntax. But these three parts are not 
on the same level; pragmatics is the basis for all of linguistics... semantics and 
syntax are, strictly speaking, parts of pragmatics. (Carnap 1942: 13 quoted in 
Mey 1994: 245) 
Many conflicting definitions of pragmatics have arisen in the course of the study of 
that field of linguistics, and David Crystal notes that no coherent pragmatic theory 
has yet been achieved. Nevertheless, many useful and refined definitions of 
pragmatics have been provided, and one of it was produced by Crystal himself. In his 
Dictionary of Linguistics and Phonetics, Crystals states that pragmatics is  
[I] the study of language from the point of view of users, especially of the 
choices they make, the constraints they encounter in using language in social 
interaction and the effects their use of language has on other participants in an 
act of communication. (Crystal 2005: 364) 
With this definition Crystal proposes that pragmatics is the study of language use in 
the sociocultural context. 
There are three philosophers and linguists that have significantly contributed to the 
development of linguistic pragmatics, and they are John Austin, John Searle, and 
Paul Grice. They focused their attention on the way speakers used language to 
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convey messages, producing utterances put in context. Hearers are then able to 
make inferences and gain information which is stored beyond what is explicit. In his 
work on pragmatics, Levinson (1983: 24) shares these ideas in a definition which 
states that  
[p]ragmatics is the study of the ability of language users to pair sentences with 
the contexts in which they would be appropriate.  
Context has been of central importance in pragmatics research. Leech (1983: 13) 
defines context as “any background knowledge assumed to be shared by s and h 
and which contributes to h's interpretation of what s means by a given utterance”. 
Words in interaction carry meaning which is dependent on physical and social 
knowledge that both speaker and hearer share.  
There are a large number of definitions describing pragmatics as the study of 
meaning in context. According to Mey (1994: 42), pragmatics is “the study of the 
conditions of human language uses as these are determined by the context of 
society”. Blum-Kulka and Hamo (2011: 143) define pragmatics as “the study of 
linguistic communication in context: the choices users of language make and the 
process of meaning-making in social interaction”, whereas George Yule (1996: 3) 
defines pragmatics as “the study of speaker meaning” as well as “the study of 
contextual meaning”.  
 
2.2 Semantics and pragmatics 
 
Pragmatics is often defined in contrast to semantics (Leech 1983, Levinson 1983, 
Mey 2001), even though many linguists consider it difficult to draw a clear line 
between the two subfields of linguistics (Bach 1997: 33). 
In 1983 Geoffrey Leech published his work Principles of pragmatics, establishing a 
theoretic view of pragmatics. Before he turns to main principles of pragmatics, he 
considers the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. According to him, they 
are distinct but complementary fields of studies, which have meaning as their main 
concern. However,  
[I] meaning in pragmatics is defined relative to a speaker or user of the 
language, whereas meaning in semantics is defined purely as a property of 
expression in a given language, in abstraction from particular situations, 
speakers or hearers. (1983: 6) 
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In his definitions of pragmatics, Leech puts emphasis on speech situation, stating 
that pragmatics studies meaning in relation to a speech situation (1983: 15). He 
offers a list of aspects of speech situations as a criterion for making the distinction 
between semantics and pragmatics, and these aspects are addressers and 
addressees, context, goals, illocutionary act, and utterance.   
While semantics relates to knowledge encoded in the vocabulary of the language, 
pragmatics is the study of the interaction of our knowledge of the world and semantic 
knowledge. In order to make such interaction feasible, it is of great importance to 
take context into account. 
In Handbook of pragmatics Jef Verschueren discusses the very common practice of 
comparing pragmatics to other areas of linguistics, such as semantics or syntax in 
order to specify and define the domain of pragmatics. He considers pragmatics to be 
“a specific perspective on language rather than a component of linguistic theory with 
its own clearly definable object of investigation” (Verschueren 1995: 16). Jacob Mey 
shares the same view stating that 
[l]inguistic pragmatics I can be said to characterize a new way of looking at 
things linguistic [i.e., ‘a perspective'], rather than marking off clear borderlines 
to other disciplines (Haberland & Mey 1977: 5, quoted in Mey 2001: 8). 
According to Verschueren, pragmatics should not be assigned “[I] its own set of 
linguistic features in contradistinction with phonology, morphology, syntax and 
semantics” (Verschueren 1995: 15). He argues that pragmatics as the study of 
meaning in context should analyse any contextual meaning of a linguistic feature, 
“whether this feature has a ‘semantics’ of its own or not” (1995: 16). If pragmatics is 
seen as a perspective of looking at things and not as a component of linguistics with 
clear borderlines, than semantics should not be used as the primary point of 
comparison when trying to define pragmatics, which is common among linguists. 
The advantage that pragmatics has over semantics is that it deals with speaker’s 
intended meaning, goals, and assumptions. However, this can also be a 
disadvantage since it is very difficult sometimes to study and understand what is 
meant by what is said (Yule 1996: 4).   
Leech (1983: 6) introduces his idea of complementarism between semantics and 
pragmatics. He distinguishes between three possible ways of describing the 
relationship: semanticism (pragmatics inside semantics), pragmaticism (semantics 
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inside pragmatics) and complementarism (pragmatics and semantics complementing 
each other). This third viewpoint is the one Leech supports, arguing that only by 
approaching meaning from a viewpoint which combines pragmatics and semantics 
can meaning be successfully explained and be “faithful to the facts as we observe 
them” and “as simple and generalizable as possible” (1983: 7). These are the criteria 
Leech considers essential. 
A major contribution to the field of pragmatics is Grice’s Cooperative Principle, which 
will be explained in the following section. 
 
2.3 Cooperative Principle – H. P. Grice 
 
Communication requires speakers to cooperate, and thus in a mutually determined 
and accepted context. When speakers communicate, they are expected to obey a set 
of norms and principles. The philosopher H. Paul Grice was concerned with the 
processes of generating meaning and understanding intended meaning. Grice (1975: 
45) argues that in most conversations “[I] each participant recognizes [I], to some 
extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted 
direction”. Furthermore, Grice states that during conversations “[I] at each stage, 
SOME possible conversational moves would be excluded, as conversationally 
unsuitable”. As a result, he developed a principle which states: “Make your 
contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted 
purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.” (1975: 45) 
Under this Cooperative Principle, Grice distinguishes four categories – Quantity, 
Quality, Relation, and Manner – and these categories consist of the following maxims 
(1975: 45-46): 
Maxims of Quantity: 
(1) Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of 
the exchange). 
(2) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 
Maxims of Quality: 
Supermaxim: Try to make your contribution one that is true, specifically: 
(1) Do not say what you believe to be false; 
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(2) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
Maxim of Relation: 
Make your contribution relevant. 
Maxims of Manner: 
Be perspicuous. 
(1) Avoid obscurity. 
(2) Avoid ambiguity. 
(3) Be brief. 
(4) Be orderly. 
With these maxims Grice suggests that there is a set of rules in communication, and 
also an accepted way of communicating. By producing an utterance, we assume that 
it is true, relevant, that it conveys enough information, and that it is understandable. 
However, if an utterance does not seem to follow the maxims, a hearer is not 
expected to consider the utterance false, but to infer the intended meaning. Grice 
was the first one to study the difference between what is meant and what is said. It 
often happens that a speaker is communicating more than he is actually expressing 
in his utterance. In other words, an intended meaning produced by a direct speech 
act could also be produced by an indirect speech act. In Grice’s terms (1975: 49), “[a] 
participant in a talk exchange may fail to fulfill a maxim”, to violate it, or “flout” it, and 
thus create an implicature. There is no explicit definition of implicature offered by 
Grice, but this is what he explains: 
A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that p has implicated 
that q, may be said to have conversationally implicated that q, PROVIDED THAT 
(1) he is to be presumed to be observing the conversational maxims, or at 
least the cooperative principle; (2) the supposition that he is aware that, or 
thinks that, q is required in order to make his saying or making as if to say p 
consistent with this presumption; and (3) the speaker thinks (and would expect 
the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of 
the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in 
(2) is required. (1975: 49) 
 
Laurence Horn offers a simple but clear definition saying that “[i]mplicature is a 
component of speaker meaning that constitutes an aspect of what is meant in a 
speaker’s utterance without being part of what is said” (Horn 2002: 3). An implicature 
is thus recognised not from a syntactic form of a sentence alone but needs to be 
derived with the help of the context of the utterance. 
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3 Pragmatics across cultures 
 
3.1 Culture 
 
The pragmatics of intercultural communication deals with investigations into 
interactions between members of different cultural groups. Since intercultural 
encounters may give rise to miscommunication, cultural differences present an 
important issue in pragmatics. But in order to explain these differences, it is essential 
to understand how culture expresses itself in communication. 
The concept of culture has been the concern of many disciplines such as philosophy, 
anthropology, sociology, cultural studies. From the anthropological point of view 
culture refers to a society’s overall way of life, i.e. a dominant set of habits which are 
learned and performed by the members of the society. In accordance to this view 
anthropologist Ward H. Goodenough offers an often quoted definition of culture by 
which he states that 
a society’s culture consists of whatever it is one has to know or believe in 
order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members, and to do so in any 
role that they accept for any one of themselves. Culture, being what people 
have to learn as distinct from biological heritage, must consist of the end 
product of learning: knowledge, in a most general, if relative, sense of the 
term. [...] culture is not a material phenomenon; it does not consist of things, 
people, behaviour, or emotions. It is rather an organization of these things. It is 
the form of things that people have in mind, their models for perceiving, 
relating, and otherwise interpreting them. As such, the things people say and 
do, their social arrangements and events, are products or by-products of their 
culture as they apply it to the task of perceiving and dealing with their 
circumstances. (Goodenough 1964: 36, referred to in Hinnenkamp 1995: 6) 
When considered in the context of communication, culture can be found in many 
different elements of interaction. According to Hinnenkamp (1995: 7), culture can be 
located in the speaker’s “ways of speaking, of structuring arguments or of 
sequencing information units”, in politeness, deference, in nonverbal signals, “in 
opinions, attitudes and worldviews”. Scollon and Scollon (2001: 140) analyse the 
aspects of culture which are major factors in intercultural communication: ideology – 
beliefs, values, religion; socialization – education, acculturation; forms of discourse – 
functions of language (information, negotiation), non-verbal communication (kinesics, 
proxemics, concept of time); face systems – kinship, the concept of the self, 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. They hold that, “from an intercultural point of view, 
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we can see that cultures often are different from each other in how much importance 
they give to one function of language over the other” (2001: 151).  
Goddard (2000: 81) writes about cultural values and norms, and explains some of the 
features in the following quotation: 
In some parts of the world, for example, it is quite normal for conversations to 
be loud, full of animation, and bristling with disagreement, while, in others, 
people prefer to avoid contention, to speak in even, well-considered phrases, 
and to guard against exposure of their inner selves. In some societies, it is 
considered very bad to speak when another person is talking, while in others, 
this is an expected part of a co-conversationalist’s work. In some places, 
silence is felt to be awkward and people rush to fill up every spare second with 
talk, while in others, silence is welcomed. 
These cultural differences present the basis for various researches in many linguistic 
fields, such as cross-cultural and intercultural pragmatics, which will be explained in 
the following sections of this thesis. 
 
3.2 Contrastive pragmatics 
 
Contrastive approach in syntax and semantics was logically followed by the 
emergence of contrastive analysis in pragmatics. The object of such analysis are 
communicative functions and the ways these functions differ from one language to 
another.  
According to Hinnenkamp (1995: 192), speech act analysis is central to contrastive 
pragmatics. How different speech acts are realised in one language is a reflection of 
cultural and pragmatic norms of that language. Contrastive pragmatics offers 
investigations of these norms and compares interactional styles of distinct speech 
communities. Kasper and Rose state that contrastive pragmatics deals with 
“analyzing and comparing the pragmatic meanings of linguistic forms, especially the 
conventions of means and form by which particular communicative acts are realized 
in different languages” (Kasper & Rose 2002: 64). 
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3.3 Cross-cultural pragmatics 
 
What researchers in cross-cultural pragmatics try to explain are differences in ways 
of speaking, paying special attention to directness, politeness, solidarity, sincerity, 
cordiality, spontaneity, and so on (Trosborg 1994: 47). A well known cross-cultural 
pragmatics research project is The Cross-Cultural Speech Act Realization Project 
(CCSARP), whose focus was to study the speech acts of requests and apologies in 
several languages (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 1984). It established a coding system for 
analysis of intralingual and cross-linguistic variations, making comparisons between 
native and nonnative speakers.  
There is a discussion among pragmatists regarding the precise definition and 
differences of the terms ‘cross-cultural’ and ‘intercultural’. Spencer-Oatey (2000: 4) 
argues that 
the term ‘cross-cultural’ is used to refer to comparative data – in other words, 
data obtained independently from different cultural groups; the term 
‘intercultural’ is used to refer to interactional data – in other words, data 
obtained when people of two different cultural groups interact with each other. 
 
Gudykunst (2000: 314) agrees with this distinction stating that “[c]ross-cultural 
research involves comparing behaviour in two or more cultures”, while “[i]ntercultural 
research involves examining behaviour when members of two or more cultures 
interact”. This view characterizes cross-cultural research as contrastive, whereas 
intercultural research deals with communication across cultures. 
Kasper and Rose (2002: 73) define cross-cultural pragmatics as “the study of 
communicative practices in different speech communities”. 
 
3.4 Interlanguage Pragmatics 
 
The term ‘interlanguage’ was first introduced by Larry Selinker to refer to a linguistic 
system “based on the observable output which results from a learner’s attempted 
production of a [target language] norm” (Selinker 1972: 214). In a broad sense, 
interlanguage is the result of the contact between two languages, which shares 
characteristics of both. Kasper’s definition describes interlanguage as 
[I] the linguistic knowledge system the learner activates when trying to 
communicate in L2. Like any other language, it comprises pragmatic, 
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semantic, syntactic, morphological and phonological rules. Unlike most other 
languages, it is typically developmental and can be permeated by learning and 
communication strategies. (Kasper 1982: 110) 
Arabski (1979: 135) notes that interlanguage (IL) can be treated like any dialect or 
register. However, he stresses two important features which distinguish it from other 
linguistic phenomena. Firstly, IL is not a complete system, but a system which is 
being built. In this respect it is similar to child language with which it shares many 
features. Secondly, IL has a unique status because of its “erroneous constructions” 
(1979: 135). 
Interlanguage pragmatics (ILP) is a relatively young linguistic area which belongs to 
both pragmatics and the second language studies domain. Its beginnings are linked 
to Hymes’ concept of communicative competence which is responsible for moving 
one step away from the grammar-focused second language pedagogy. The works of 
Hymes and other linguists, such as Canale and Swain (1980) and Bachman (1990), 
made a significant contribution to the growing interest in pragmatics research and 
language learning. Current trends in communicative approach see grammar as less 
important for successful communication. Speakers are encouraged to communicate 
so as to get across the meaning, regardless of possible grammatical errors.  
Emphasising interdisciplinarity of ILP, Kasper and Rose offer the following definition: 
As the study of second language use, interlanguage pragmatics examines 
how nonnative speakers comprehend and produce action in a target language. 
As the study of second language learning, interlanguage pragmatics 
investigates how L2 learners develop the ability to understand and perform 
action in a target language. (Kasper & Rose 2002: 5) 
 
First of all, they argue that language learners need to acquire communicative 
competence in their second language, and to be able to produce appropriate 
utterances in a given situation. That means that language learners also need to 
develop awareness of appropriate linguistic behaviour in L2 communication, which 
makes a connection between L2 pragmatic knowledge and culture. 
Interlanguage pragmatics research is largely focused on L2 learner comprehension 
and production of speech acts. Some of the speech acts which are mostly 
investigated are requests, apologies, complaints, refusals, and compliments (e.g. 
Cohen & Olshtain 1981, 1983; Blum-Kulka et al. 1989; Trosborg 1995). Recent 
studies point to the fact that majority of interlanguage pragmatics studies are 
comparative studies focusing on language use with very little attention on 
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development. Bardovi-Harlig has clearly expressed her view on this issue stating that 
“not only [is] interlanguage pragmatics not fundamentally acquisitional, but it [is], in 
fact, fundamentally not acquisitional” (Bardovi-Harlig 1999: 679). She observes that 
the areas of research in interlanguage pragmatics are completely different from those 
in second language acquisition, despite the fact that interlanguage pragmatics is a 
hybrid discipline integrating both pragmatics and second language acquisition 
studies. That is a consequence of the dominance of comparative studies over 
acquisition studies in ILP. Similar observations have been made by Kasper and 
Schmidt (1996), who argue that “ILP has been primarily a study of second language 
use rather than second language learning” with an accent put on the ways non-native 
speakers’ sociopragmatic and pragmalinguistic knowledge differs from that of native 
speakers (Kasper & Schmidt 1996: 150). They see the main reason for focusing on 
language use and not on acquisition to be cross-cultural pragmatics, which has 
served as ILP’s main field of reference. As a result, the questions asked and the 
issues researched in ILP have been the same as those investigated in cross-cultural 
pragmatics, and those are related to speech act strategies, contextual distribution of 
speech act patterns, politeness strategies. 
Another important concern of ILP is the influence of native language (L1) and culture 
on the second language (L2). The process of language transfer is considered to have 
received reasonable attention in ILP research. Selinker introduces the concept of 
fossilization, and defines fossilizable linguistic phenomena as “linguistic items, rules, 
and subsystems which speakers of a particular [native language] will tend to keep in 
their IL relative to a particular [target language]” (Selinker 1972: 215). 
Selinker lists five processes he considers central to interlanguage, and these are: 
language transfer, transfer-of-training (i.e. how the L2 is taught), strategies of second 
language learning, strategies of second language communication, and 
overgeneralization of target language linguistic material (1972: 215). These 
processes are considered important in interlanguage pragmatics research. 
Therefore, the following chapter deals with pragmatic transfer as part of the concept 
of language transfer. 
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4 Pragmatic transfer 
 
In order for speakers to be communicatively competent in L2, they need to acquire 
not only grammatical but also pragmatic competence. Lack of pragmatic competence 
may lead to pragmatic transfer, a cognitive phenomenon which occurs when L1 
structures influence the performance of forms in L2. This process may, but need not, 
lead to pragmatic failure, i.e. miscommunication. The following sections deal with the 
concept of language competence and explain the process and the types of pragmatic 
transfer. 
 
4.1 Communicative competence 
 
The notion of competence was introduced by Noam Chomsky in his theory of 
language, i.e. competence and performance (1965). For Chomsky, competence 
refers to the shared knowledge of the ideal speaker-listener set in a homogenous 
speech community, while performance refers to the process of applying that 
knowledge to the actual language use in concrete situations (Chomsky 1965: 3-4). 
What he means by his dichotomy is explained in the following quotation: 
A distinction must be made between what the speaker of a language knows 
implicitly (what we may call his competence) and what he does (his 
performance). A grammar, in the traditional view, is an account of 
competence. It describes and attempts to account for the ability of a speaker 
to understand an arbitrary sentence of his language and to produce an 
appropriate sentence on a given occasion. If it is a pedagogic grammar, it 
attempts to provide the student with this ability; if a linguistic grammar, it aims 
to discover and exhibit the mechanisms that make this achievement possible. 
The competence of the speaker-hearer can, ideally, be expressed as a system 
of rules that relate signals to semantic interpretations of these signals. The 
problem of the grammarian is to discover this system of rules[.] (Chomsky 
1965: 9-10)  
However, Chomsky's conception of competence, by which he attempted to explain 
language, saw many different reactions in the 1970s. Campbell and Wales (1970) 
and Hymes (1972) were among those who criticized Chomsky’s theory, and thought 
it was too narrow. Pointing to its deficiencies, Campbell and Wales believed that it 
failed to implement the most important linguistic ability, which is “to produce or 
understand utterances which are not so much grammatical but, more important, 
appropriate to the context in which they are made” (Campbell & Wales 1970: 247). 
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As Canale and Swain explain it, Chomsky’s “theory of competence is equivalent to 
the theory of grammar and is concerned with the linguistic rules that can generate 
and describe the grammatical [I] sentences of a language” (Canale & Swain 1980: 
3). This explanation reflects Hymes’ reception of Chomsky’s definition, and he states 
that “there are rules of use without which the rules of grammar would be useless” 
(Hymes 1972: 278). Hymes wrote about the concept of communicative competence 
and offered an extended definition of it which included sociolinguistic as well as 
contextual competence. Apart from grammatical knowledge, speakers of a language 
also need to possess socio-cultural knowledge of the rules of language use. 
According to Hymes, communicative competence can be expanded into four 
constituent features which could be seen as judgements that one might make about 
a sentence, whether it is: formally possible, feasible, appropriate in a given context, 
and actually performed. 
The notion of communicative competence was later examined by Canale and Swain 
(1980), who dealt with it within the field of second language learning, teaching, and 
testing. According to them, communicative competence refers to 
[I] the relationship and interaction between grammatical competence, or 
knowledge of the rules of grammar, and sociolinguistic competence, or 
knowledge of the rules of language use. Communicative competence is to be 
distinguished from communicative performance, which is the realization of 
these competencies and their interaction in the actual production and 
comprehension of utterances (under general psychological constraints that are 
unique to performance). (Canale & Swain 1980: 6) 
They emphasize the importance of the distinction between communicative 
competence and communicative performance, and argue that both these concepts 
are not to be seen as the highest or broadest level of language competence or 
performance, but as subcomponents of the more general language competence and 
language performance. Moreover, Canale and Swain (1980: 30-31) propose a 
theoretical framework which consists of grammatical competence, sociolinguistic 
competence, and strategic competence. Grammatical competence includes 
knowledge of lexical items and of rules of morphology, syntax, sentence-grammar 
semantics, and phonology. Sociolinguistic competence consists of two sets of rules – 
socio-cultural rules and rules of discourse. The first of the two refer to the 
appropriateness of an utterance produced in a specific social context, and the latter 
rules refer to the knowledge of the rules governing cohesion and coherence. 
Strategic competence consists of verbal and non-verbal communication strategies 
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that may be used by a speaker or hearer in order to compensate a lack in 
knowledge. Canale and Swain’s theory represents a further development of Hymes’ 
model of communicative competence.  
 
4.2 Pragmatic competence 
 
Pragmatic competence has been included in the models of communicative 
competence, and it is considered an essential part of second language teaching. 
Chomsky writes about the construct of pragmatic competence, and defines it as  
[I] the ability to use such knowledge along with the conceptual system to 
achieve certain ends or purposes. It might be that pragmatic competence is 
characterized by a certain system of constitutive rules represented in the mind, 
as has been suggested in a number of studies. (Chomsky 1980: 59) 
However, Trosborg and Shaw (1998) note that pragmatic competence still lacks its 
own theory and a reliable account of its constituents. According to them, pragmatic 
competence can be described in terms of pragmalinguistic competence, or 
“knowledge of the linguistic inventory used to perform pragmatic functions”, and 
sociopragmatic competence, or “knowledge of when to use these forms in actual 
social situations” (Trosborg & Shaw 1998: 67). They are regarded as two aspects of 
pragmatic competence. Both pragmalinguistics and sociopragmatics are terms 
introduced by Leech (1983) to divide pragmatics into two components, and they were 
later used by Thomas (1983) to classify pragmatic failure, and by Kasper (1992) for a 
categorisation of pragmatic transfer. The following chapter discusses those 
classifications in more detail. 
A more recent contribution to the theory of communicative competence which is 
considered to be a further reinterpretation of Canale and Swain’s model is 
Bachman’s theory of communicative language ability. Not only did he suggest the 
model of language competence which included pragmatic competence as one of its 
main components, but he was also the first one to consider pragmatic competence 
as not subordinated to grammatical competence and text organization. 
Bachman (1990) suggests the division of language competence, a learner’s 
knowledge of language, into organizational and pragmatic competences, which are 
further subdivided into smaller elements.  
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Figure 1 Components of language competence (Bachman 1990: 87) 
 
He subdivides organizational competence into two types of abilities used in 
communicating, and those are grammatical and textual. Bachman explains that this 
kind of competence is responsible for controlling the structure of sentences as well 
as ordering them to form a text (Bachman 1990: 87). He introduces pragmatic 
competence and defines it as “the relationships between utterances and the acts or 
functions that speakers (or writers) intend to perform through these utterances, which 
can be called the illocutionary force of utterances, and the characteristics of the 
context of language use that determine the appropriateness of utterances” (1990: 89-
90). In his view, pragmatic competence includes illocutionary competence, or “the 
knowledge of the pragmatic conventions for performing acceptable language 
functions”, and sociolinguistic competence, or “knowledge of the sociolinguistic 
conventions for performing language functions appropriately in a given context” 
(1990: 90). Illocutionary force will be further discussed in the chapter on speech acts 
in this paper. 
Littlewood (2004: 503) states that “pragmatic competence [I] enables second 
language speakers to use their linguistic resources in order to convey and interpret 
meanings in real situations, including those where they encounter problems due to 
gaps in their knowledge”. Such problematic situations call for the use of a specific 
strategy of integrating native-language-based elements in the production of a target 
language, which is otherwise recognized as language transfer. 
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4.3 Communication strategies 
 
Much research has been done on communication strategies, and many researchers 
have contributed to their recognition as a major component in communicative 
competence. The widely used definition of communication strategies was offered by 
Canale and Swain (1980: 30), who refer to them as “verbal and nonverbal strategies 
that may be called into action to compensate for breakdowns in communication due 
to performance variables or to insufficient competence”.  
Faerch and Kasper (1980: 81) approach communication strategies from a 
psycholinguistic perspective and according to them, communications strategies are 
“potentially conscious plans for solving what to an individual presents itself as a 
problem in reaching a particular communicative goal”. Another important approach is 
presented by Tarone (1980: 420), who characterizes communication strategies as 
[I] mutual attempts of two interlocutors to agree on a meaning in situations 
where the requisite meaning structures do not seem to be shared. 
[Communication strategies] are seen as tools used in a joint negotiation of 
meaning in situations where both interlocutors are attempting to agree as to 
communicative goal. 
Riley (1989: 240) summarizes discussions on communication strategies and their 
focus, and he observes that there is a consensus that the term should be used for 
instances when interactants are aware of an existing communicative problem. He 
also gives a list of techniques used for negotiations of meaning, and it includes: 
 Evasion (including message abandonment and change of focus). 
Paraphrase (including approximation, circumlocution, description and word 
coinage). 
Transfer (including literal translation and language switch). 
Appeals (for assistance, clarification or feedback). 
Non-verbal (gesture, mime, facial expression, showing, writing, drawing 
expressive interjections, acoustic imitations). 
Checks (giving further information, examples, contextualising, comparing). 
Simplification (of grammar or vocabulary). (Riley 1989: 240) 
These techniques occur in both native-speaker discourse and foreigner-talk, and 
Riley defines them as 
[I] procedures for identifying, sharing and agreeing on meanings in 
interactive discourse: In other words, where an interactant has reason to 
believe that a given meaning-structure (linguistic or social) is not shared, 
he/she is faced with a communicative problem and the nature of his response 
to that problem defines his/her communicative strategy. (1989: 240-241) 
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An important point was made by Corder (1992), who emphasized the significance of 
the distinction between the concepts of transfer and borrowing. Corder argues that 
transfer is a process of learning which occurs “from the mental structure which is the 
implicit knowledge of the mother tongue to the separate and independently 
developing knowledge of the target language” (Corder 1992: 25). Borrowing, on the 
other hand, is “a performance phenomenon, not a learning process, a feature of 
language use and not of language structure” (1992: 26). Corder refers to borrowing 
as a strategy of communication which is employed in interaction when the speaker 
lacks means in his interlanguage to convey certain meaning. However, Corder points 
out to the difficulty of distinguishing between the results of transfer and borrowing, so 
he proposes an explanation whereby borrowing presents “the mechanism” by which 
transfer takes place (1992: 28). Speculating that transfer may result from borrowing, 
he states that “after regular, repeated, and communicatively successful use of the 
borrowed items [I] they come to be incorporated into the language system of the 
borrower’s mother tongue” (1992: 28-29). 
 
 
4.4 Pragmatic transfer 
 
Extensive research has been done on language transfer in the area of interlanguage 
and second language acquisition. Researchers have concentrated on the effects of 
the learners’ L1 on their development and use of the L2. Results show that in most 
cases L1 interferes in the learners’ acquisition of the second language (e.g. Odlin 
1989, Gass & Selinker 1992). The focus of those studies was largely syntax, 
phonology, and lexicon until the 1980s, when interest in pragmatics started to grow. 
The nature of interference depends on the perspective from which it is approached, 
and Dulay, Burt, and Krashen (1982:92) identify psychological perspective and 
sociolinguistic perspective: 
Interference has been used to refer to two very distinct linguistic phenomena, 
one that is essentially psychological and another that is essentially 
sociolinguistic. The psychological use of the term interference refers to the 
influence of old habits when new ones are being learned, whereas the 
sociolinguistic use of interference refers to language interactions, such as 
linguistic borrowing and language switching, that occur when two communities 
are in contact. 
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The term ‘interference’ was introduced by Weinreich to refer to “those instances of 
deviation from the norms of either language which occur in the speech of bilinguals 
as a result of their familiarity with more than one language, i.e. as a result of 
language contact” (Weinreich 1953: 1). However, these deviations in second 
language use had a tendency to be considered as flaws or failures, so researchers in 
second language acquisition (SLA) started using the term transfer, rather than 
interference. With regard to that, Sankoff (2001: 2) notes that “the term interlanguage 
was also introduced in an effort to conceptualize the linguistic system of the second 
language learner as rule-governed and orderly, rather than an error-ridden version of 
the target language”. In Bialystok and Sharwood-Smith’s viewpoint, the use of L1 
material in an L2 context refers to both interference and transfer, and the distinction 
between these two concepts could be explained in terms of “behaviourist model” and 
“cognitive model” (Bialystok & Sharwood-Smith 1985: 115). What they mean by the 
two models is clearly explained in the following quotation: 
The interference error is the result of a retrieval procedure that is fairly 
automatic, an aspect of control, and is invoked in L2 speech as part of a 
control error. The transfer error, however, is the result of a deficiency in L2 
knowledge, and the L1 becomes involved to fill that gap. Thus, while they 
remain distinct strategies in spite of the fact that both lead to the insertion of 
L1, the difference between them is explained in terms of their reflecting one of 
the two aspects of cognitive functioning which are responsible for language 
production. (1985: 115) 
 
In an attempt to differentiate between interference and transfer, Grosjean (2011) has 
proposed the existence of two kinds of interference. There is static interference which 
is a permanent trace of L1 on the L2, and which is linked to the learner’s competence 
in L2. This kind of interference is present at all levels of linguistic knowledge, and an 
example of this could be a foreign accent, or the constant misuse of a preposition. 
The other kind of interference is dynamic interference, which Grosjean defines as 
“the ephemeral intrusions of the other language” (Grosjean 2011: 5). An instance of 
this type of interference could be the one time use of a word or a syntactic structure 
from the L1 in the L2. Grosjean further suggests the use of the term ‘transfer’ for 
static interferences, and the term ‘interference’ for dynamic interferences. However, 
he notes that it would be necessary to develop techniques to differentiate between 
these two phenomena, since it is very difficult sometimes to say whether a certain 
element is an instance of transfer or interference (2011: 5). 
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Kasper (1992: 207) defines pragmatic transfer as “the influence exerted by learners’ 
pragmatic knowledge of languages and cultures other than L2 on their 
comprehension, production and learning of L2 pragmatic information”. In their work 
on pragmatic transfer, Žegarac and Pennington (2000: 166) offer a similar definition 
which says that “[p]ragmatic transfer is the transfer of pragmatic knowledge in 
situations of intercultural communication”. They point to the notion of mental sets, 
which are largely determined by culture-specific knowledge. Therefore, when 
interactants from different cultural backgrounds communicate but are unaware of the 
differences in their mental sets, this might cause misunderstandings to occur. 
However, the complexity of such definition is pointed to by Žegarac and Pennington 
(2000: 143) themselves, stressing the lack of universal agreement among 
researchers on certain questions regarding pragmatic knowledge. They believe that 
there are still unanswered questions about what pragmatic knowledge is, how it is 
employed, and what the relationship between linguistic knowledge and pragmatic 
knowledge is. 
 
4.4.1 Types of pragmatic transfer 
 
In accordance with Leech’s (1983) distinction between pragmalinguistics and 
sociopragmatics, Kasper writes about two types of pragmatic transfer: 
pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic. She defines pragmalinguistic transfer as  
[I] the process whereby the illocutionary force or politeness value assigned to 
particular linguistic material in L1 influences learners’ perception and 
production of form-function mappings in L2. (Kasper 1992: 209) 
This concept deals with the transfer of certain L1 forms which may affect the 
illocutionary force and politeness value of a produced utterance in interlanguage.  
Sociopragmatic transfer is the concept which includes context-external and context-
internal factors in communication, and refers to the learner’s decision on the use of a 
strategy, according to the perception of social distance and power.  
Sociopragmatic transfer, then, is operative when the social perceptions 
underlying language users’ interpretation and performance of linguistic action 
in L2 are influenced by their assessment of subjectively equivalent L1 
contexts. (1992: 209) 
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Even though both aspects of pragmatic transfer are clearly defined, Kasper (1992: 
210) points out that they are interrelated, and it is often difficult to make a distinction 
between them. 
A further distinction is made between positive and negative transfer. Positive transfer 
in communication happens “when learners’ production of a pragmatic feature is the 
same (structurally, functionally, distributionally) as a feature used by target language 
speakers in the same context, and this feature is paralleled by a comparable element 
in learners’ L1” (Kasper 2010:146). However, when learners use strategies which are 
present in most languages, and not only in L1 and L2, they are, actually, employing 
their universal pragmatic knowledge. Pragmatic universals are not always easy to 
distinguish from positive transfer, and that could be one of the reasons why positive 
transfer has very rarely been examined by researchers (Takahashi 2000: 115). On 
the other hand, negative transfer has received a lot more attention in interlanguage 
pragmatics over the years. Negative transfer is employed “when a pragmatic feature 
in the interlanguage is (structurally, functionally, distributionally) the same as in L1 
but different from L2” (Kasper 2010: 147). Both pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic 
knowledge may be transferred from L1 to L2 communication. Examples of negative 
pragmalinguistic transfer are literal translations of pragmatic items which do not 
correspond to L2 norms, or instances where illocutionary force in L2 is produced in a 
manner different from the one in the target language. According to some research 
reports, there are many instances when the level of politeness is affected by the 
learner’s choice of a less direct speech acts strategy which conforms more to the L1 
than to the L2 norms (e.g. Blum-Kulka 1983, House & Kasper 1987, Cohen & 
Olshtain 1981). As regards sociopragmatic transfer, Barron (2003: 38) notes three 
areas where L1 may influence the realization of L2 communication resulting in 
negative effects, and these are: learners’ evaluation of context factors, the overall 
politeness style, and the relative appropriateness of a particular speech act. 
Investigations dealing with these areas show instances where learners expressed 
lower degree of apology in L2 than L2 native speakers (Olshtain 1983), or cases 
where the L2 learner transferred style-shifting patterns from L1 by choosing different 
strategies according to the learner’s assessment of the interlocutors’ social status 
(Beebe, Takahashi, & Uliss-Weltz 1990). 
Although negative pragmatic transfer leads to pragmatic failure, it is considered only 
a potential cause of misunderstanding. Kasper (2010: 149) argues that “[w]hile it is 
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true that negative pragmatic transfer can cause miscommunication, there is no 
logical and empirical reason that it has to”, and she stresses that “negative pragmatic 
transfer is not the same as pragmatic failure”. The following section juxtaposes the 
two and outlines the concept of pragmatic failure in learner communication. 
 
4.4.2 Pragmatic failure 
 
One aspect of cross-cultural communication which has received considerable 
attention in recent years is the concept of pragmatic failure. When interlocutors do 
not share the same cultural background and pragmatic rules, these differences 
between them may easily lead to a break-down in communication. There are many 
different terms used for this phenomenon in linguistics – problematic talk, 
miscommunication, communication breakdown, troubled discourse, pragmatic errors 
– and all these terms refer to critical moments of talk exchange.  
The concept of pragmatic failure was used by Thomas to refer to situations when “H 
perceives the force of S’s utterance as other than S intended s/he should perceive it” 
(Thomas 1983: 26). She considers not only native–non-native communication, but 
any communication between two people who do not share a common linguistic or 
cultural background. There are two types of pragmatic failure, and those are 
pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic failure. Thomas (1983: 32-33) describes them 
as follows: 
Pragmalinguistic failure [I] occurs when the pragmatic force mapped by S 
(speaker) onto a given utterance is systematically different from the force most 
frequently assigned to it by native speakers of the target language, or when 
speech act strategies are inappropriately transferred from L1 to L2. 
Sociopragmatic failure [I] refers to the social conditions placed on language 
in use. [I] [W]hile pragmalinguistic failure is basically a linguistic problem, 
caused by differences in the linguistic encoding of pragmatic force, 
sociopragmatic failure stems form cross-culturally different perceptions of what 
constitutes appropriate linguistic behaviour.  
The importance of these definitions lies in the distinction that is made between 
language-specific norms and culture-specific norms. Although both situations result 
in inappropriate language production, the type of dysfunction is not the same. 
Pragmalinguistic failure refers to the inability to interpret or produce meanings 
correctly, and sociopragmatic failure refers to the inability to evaluate social situations 
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according to cultural norms and rules. More specifically, pragmalinguistic failures are 
likely to occur when speakers inappropriately transfer speech act strategies from 
their mother tongue to the target language. In this way they create a different 
pragmatic force than in their first language, which can often lead to an error. In 
addition, pragmalinguistic failures may occur when speakers inappropriately transfer 
from L1 to L2 structures which are semantically/syntactically equivalent (1983: 35). 
On the other hand, sociopragmatic failure originates from different cross-cultural 
evaluations of what is appropriate language use. Situations causing sociopragmatic 
failure could be “cross-cultural mismatches in the assessment of social distance, of 
what constitutes an imposition, [I] in evaluating relative power, rights, and 
obligations” (1983: 39). However, it must be stated that the distinction between 
pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic failure remains fuzzy because they both belong 
to the field of pragmatic failure, and they certainly overlap to some degree. 
In his work on pragmatic errors, Riley (1989: 234) offers the following definition: 
Pragmatic errors are the result of an interactant’s imposing the social rules of 
one culture on his communicative behaviour in a situation where the social 
rules of another culture would be more appropriate. 
With this definition Riley wanted to broaden the scope of pragmatic failure, and to 
make it valid not only for linguistic aspects of communication, but for communicative 
behaviour in the widest possible sense. Namely, this definition allowed Riley to 
introduce another two categories of pragmatic failure – inchoative pragmatic errors 
and non-linguistic pragmatic errors. Inchoative pragmatic errors refer to “failure to 
appreciate the conventional value and social role of discourse and the relative values 
of speech and silence”, and their main characteristic is when a speaker talks too 
much or too little with regard to the event, topic being discussed or role-relationship 
(Riley 1984: 133). With the inclusion of non-linguistic pragmatic errors as a separate 
category Riley stresses the fact that “not all communicative behaviour is verbal” 
(1989: 238). However, he argues that even though these two categories have 
received attention from linguists, they have not been accepted as separate 
categories of pragmatic failure. 
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5. Politeness 
 
An important task in learning a language is acquiring knowledge of how and when it 
is appropriate to use particular language forms. Politeness is a phenomenon which 
has been much researched over the last thirty years, but there is still lack of 
agreement among researchers as to what constitutes politeness. 
Most commonly seen as socially appropriate behaviour, politeness is defined as 
“having or showing good manners, consideration for others, and/or correct social 
behavior” (Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English). Hill et al. (1986: 349) see 
politeness as consideration for others, stating that the purpose of politeness is “to 
consider others’ feelings, establish levels of mutual comfort, and promote rapport”. 
With this definition they point not only to considerateness as a goal, but also to the 
maintaining of harmony. Concentrating on the hearer, Adegbija (1989: 58) defines 
politeness as “a property associated with a communicative situation by virtue of 
which a person speaks or behaves in a way that is socially and culturally acceptable 
and pleasant to the hearer”. For Lakoff (1990: 34) politeness is “a system of 
interpersonal relations designed to facilitate interaction by minimizing the potential for 
conflict and confrontation inherent in all human interchange”.  
Locher (2004: 91) suggests a definition for politeness considering it from both the 
speaker’s and the hearer’s perspective: 
 Politeness for the speaker: 
A polite utterance is a speaker’s intended, marked and appropriate behavior 
which displays face concern; the motivation for it lies in the possibly, but not 
necessarily, egocentric desire of the speaker to show positive concern for the 
addressees and/or to respect the addressees’ and the speaker’s own need for 
independence. 
Politeness for the hearer: 
Addressees will interpret an utterance as polite when it is perceived as 
appropriate and marked; the reason for this is understood as the speaker’s 
intention to show positive concern for the addressees’ face and/or the 
speaker’s intention to protect his or her own face needs. 
Locher argues that politeness can be investigated only by looking in detail at the 
speakers, the situation, the context and the norms.  
The following sections look into traditional politeness theories (Lakoff 1973, Leech 
1983, Brown & Levinson 1987) as well as into some more recent ones (Watts 2003). 
 
 25 
5.1 Perspectives on politeness 
 
Fraser (1990) offers a critical overview of different approaches to politeness. He 
identifies four major perspectives on the analysis of politeness: the social-norm view, 
the conversational-maxim view, the face-saving view, and the conversational-
contract view. Fraser notes that many of the writers do not explicitly define 
politeness, and what they understand by the concept has to be inferred from 
statements referencing the term (1990: 219).  
The social-norm view assumes that all societies have rules and norms for 
appropriate behaviour. In relation to that, “[a] positive evaluation (politeness) arises 
when an action is in congruence with the norm, a negative evaluation 
(impoliteness=rudeness) when action is to the contrary” (1990: 220). This kind of 
view associates politeness with speech style, whereby the degree of formality is 
directly proportional to the degree of politeness. 
The conversational-maxim view is based on Grice’s Cooperative Principle and the 
set of conversational maxims. He explains that interactants cooperate with each 
other effectively when they conform to these maxims. However, they may choose to 
violate a maxim, and create implicatures, whereby the hearer needs to infer the 
speaker’s intended meaning. He also suggests that additional maxims should be 
incorporated into the Cooperative Principle, one of which could be a maxim of 
politeness. And it was this suggestion that prompted scholars Lakoff and Leech to 
expand the existing set of maxims with their models of politeness. Robin Lakoff's 
approach is marked by the rules of politeness, a subcase of which are the rules of 
conversation (be clear), i.e. the Gricean Cooperative Principle. The rules of 
politeness (be polite) consist of three sets of rules: don’t impose, give options, and 
make addressee feel good (Lakoff 1973). However, Watts (2003: 60) criticizes this 
model stating that “if a speaker follows the rules of politeness by not imposing, giving 
options and making [addressee] feel good, s/he will be certain at some stage or 
another in the interaction to violate the rules of conversation”, and he considers this 
to be “one of the great weaknesses of models constructed along Gricean lines”. In 
addition to these rules, Lakoff suggests three types of politeness, and these are: 
formal politeness, informal politeness and intimate politeness. Depending on the type 
of politeness as perceived by the speaker in a situation, the three rules could be 
applied. Following Lakoff, Geoffrey Leech develops his model of politeness based on 
 26 
Grice’s maxims. He chooses interpersonal rhetoric as the domain within which he 
constitutes the following sets of principles: the Cooperative Principle (Grice), the 
Politeness Principle and the Irony Principle (1983: 16). The following section (5.2) will 
deal with Leech’s approach in more detail. 
The face-saving view of politeness is represented by Brown and Levinson’s model, 
one that has attracted considerable attention and caused most controversies 
compared to all other works on politeness. It is based on the notion of face, a 
concept first introduced by Erving Goffman. Brown and Levinson believe that every 
person has two types of face: negative – “the desire to be unimpeded in one’s 
actions”, and positive – “the desire to be approved of” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 13). 
In order to maintain the face of every interactant, there are politeness strategies 
which need to be used in conversations. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 deal with Brown and 
Levinson’s theory and its criticism. 
The conversational-contract view is the fourth and final perspective on politeness, 
and it is taken by Fraser (1975). According to him, when interactants begin a 
conversation, they enter a conversational contract (CC), which refers to rights and 
obligations they have towards each other. This initial set of rights and obligations 
may be renegotiated during the conversation, if, for instance, the context changes. 
For Fraser (1990: 233) politeness means “operating within the then-current terms 
and conditions of the CC”. He further explains that 
[r]ational participants are aware that they are to act within the negotiated 
constraints and generally do so. When they do not, however, they are then 
perceived as being impolite or rude. Politeness is a state that one expects to 
exist in every conversation; participants note not that someone is being polite 
– this is the norm – but rather that the speaker is violating the CC. (1990: 233) 
In his view, politeness is present in every conversation, but it depends on the hearer 
whether an utterance will be considered appropriate or not. One of the followers of 
Fraser’s theory of politeness is Meier (1995b: 387), who agues that the right 
definition for politeness is to be found in the term ‘appropriateness’. According to her, 
norms for socially acceptable behaviour are present in all societies, and they vary 
across cultures. She further explains: 
A set of norms and dependable adherence to these norms within a group 
engenders a structure and predictability which results in a considerable saving 
of energy in everyday life and can be viewed as serving the goal of something 
akin to social harmony and perhaps even survival. Individuals are thus 
motivated to adhere to these norms (thereby maintaining a desired image) 
 27 
because of the subsequent social value and consequent ‘power’ they are 
accorded in relation to a group. (1995a: 352) 
 
What Meier emphasises is the importance of the existence of the norms and the 
motivation to comply with them. Any deviations from the norms are considered 
impolite. However, Locher (2004: 72) criticizes this view stating that it only deals with 
negative deviations and excludes “a positive breach of these norms”. She argues that 
there are some instances of behaviour which are not expected by participants in an 
interaction, but are still considered polite. As an example Locher (2004: 72) suggests 
a situation of helping a woman with her coat which is not regarded today as 
necessary in Switzerland and, therefore, is not a norm, but is still thought to be polite 
behaviour.  
 
5.2 Leech’s model of politeness 
 
Leech’s model of politeness is the first model of politeness. It is considered the most 
influential one, and still serves as a theoretical framework for researchers and their 
empirical work. Watts (2003: 63) observes the following: 
The fact remains that only Leech and Brown and Levinson have elaborated 
their positions in sufficient detail to allow them to be tested through application 
to real-language data. In addition, only these two models have given extensive 
examples of the kinds of linguistic structures that are put to use to realise 
politeness strategies. Researchers are thus given data and analyses of these 
data that they can check against their own materials.  
In his work on general pragmatics, Leech (1983) chooses rhetorical approach, 
concentrating on the use of language in the most general sense. He distinguishes 
two types of rhetoric – interpersonal and textual, each of which consists of a set of 
principles. The three main principles which comprise interpersonal rhetoric are the 
Cooperative Principle (i.e. Grice’s CP), the Politeness Principle (PP) and the Irony 
Principle, while textual rhetoric consists of  the Processibility Principle, the Clarity 
Principle, the Economy Principle and the Expressivity Principle. Leech deals with 
politeness phenomena within the domain of interpersonal rhetoric, trying to explain 
how the PP and the CP interact to help the interpretation of messages. This is how 
he sees the relation between the two principles: 
The CP enables one participant in a conversation to communicate on the 
assumption that the other participant is being cooperative. In this the CP has 
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the function of regulating what we say so that it contributes to some assumed 
illocutionary or discoursal goal(s). It could be argued, however, that the PP 
has a higher regulative role than this: to maintain the social equilibrium and the 
friendly relations which enable us to assume that our interlocutors are being 
cooperative in the first place. (Leech 1983: 82) 
 
Leech (1983: 123) introduces three types of pragmatic scales which relate to the 
degree of tact appropriate to a speech situation – the cost-benefit scale, the 
optionality scale and the indirectness scale. He further adds another two scales he 
considers relevant to politeness and these are the power or authority scale and social 
distance scale. In Leech’s point of view, politeness means minimising the cost to the 
speaker/hearer and maximising the benefit to the speaker/hearer. In this respect, he 
proposes six maxims that compose the PP, and which are explained in terms of cost 
and benefit (1983: 132): 
TACT MAXIM (in impositives and commissives) 
(a) Minimize cost to other 
[(b) Maximize benefit to other] 
GENEROSITY MAXIM (in impositives and commissives) 
(a) Minimize benefit to self 
[(b) Maximize cost to self] 
APPROBATION MAXIM (in expressives and assertives) 
(a) Minimize dispraise of other  
[(b) Maximize praise of other] 
MODESTY MAXIM (in expressives and assertives) 
(a) Minimize praise of self 
[(b) Maximize dispraise of self] 
AGREEMENT MAXIM (in assertives) 
(a) Minimize disagreement between self and other 
[(b) Maximize agreement between self and other] 
SYMPATHY MAXIM (in assertives) 
(a) Minimize antipathy between self and other 
[(b) Maximize sympathy between self and other] 
 
Not all these maxims are equally important for Leech. He assigns greater importance 
to the tact and approbation maxim as compared to, for example, generosity or 
modesty maxim, because he believes that “politeness is focused more strongly on 
other than on self” (1983: 133).  
Depending on the situation, there are different kinds and degrees of politeness. 
Leech identifies four illocutionary functions “according to how they relate to social 
goal of establishing and maintaining comity” (1983: 104), and they are: 
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COMPETITIVE: The illocutionary goal competes with the social goal; eg ordering, 
asking, demanding, begging, etc. 
CONVIVIAL: The illocutionary goal coincides with the social goal; eg offering, inviting, 
greeting, thanking, congratulating. 
COLABORATIVE: The illocutionary goal is indifferent to the social goal; eg asserting, 
reporting, announcing, instructing. 
CONFLICTIVE: The illocutionary goal conflicts with the social goal; eg threatening, 
accusing, cursing, reprimanding. 
According to Leech (1983: 83), “[s]ome illocutions (eg orders) are inherently impolite, 
and others (eg offers) are inherently polite”. Fraser, however, expresses 
disagreement with this kind of proposal, and believes that Leech’s conclusions are 
too strong. He sees the problem in Leech’s assertion that certain types of illocutions 
are either polite or impolite, so he argues that “[w]hile the performance of an 
illocutionary act can be so evaluated, the same cannot be said of the act itself” 
(Fraser 1990: 227). Mey (2001: 80) shares this view arguing that “[b]eing inherently 
polite implies being always polite, without regard for the contextual factors that define 
what is polite in a given situation”, and this is, in his view, wrong on several counts. 
He emphasizes the dependence of individual cases on the social position of the 
speakers, claiming that “the existence of a social hierarchy (as in institutionalized 
contexts such as the schools, the military, religious communities etc.) often pre-
empts the use of politeness altogether” (2001: 80).  Another critical view is offered by 
Watts (2003: 69), who agrees with Fraser, and also claims that Leech “gives the 
researcher no clear idea of how an individual participating in an interaction can 
possibly know the degree and type of politeness required for the performance of a 
speech act”. Apart from that, Leech’s approach has received criticism from Brown 
and Levinson regarding the number of maxims. Brown and Levinson (1987: 4) 
believe that if interactants are allowed to invent a new maxim for every regular use of 
language in a conversation, “not only will we have an infinite number of maxims, but 
pragmatic theory will be too unconstrained to permit the recognition of any counter-
examples”. Moreover, they say that “every discernable pattern of language use does 
not, eo ipso, require a maxim or principle to produce it” (1987: 5).  
 
5.3 Brown and Levinson’s Politeness Theory 
 
Brown and Levinson’s model of politeness first appeared in 1978, and eight years 
later it was republished as a book entitled Politeness: some universals in language 
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usage. The approach they take is largely based on Goffman’s notion of face and 
Grice’s Cooperative Principle.  
 
5.3.1 Face 
 
Goffman (1967: 5) defines his original concept of ‘face’ as follows:  
The term face may be defined as the positive social value a person effectively 
claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during the particular 
contact. Face is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social 
attributes – albeit an image that others may share, as when a person makes a 
good showing for his profession or religion by making a good showing for 
himself. 
Face is presented as an image which every person possesses during a conversation. 
It is a mask which is possible to change depending on the situation (Locher 2004: 
52). However, face is not a private property but it rather depends on others, i.e. 
society: 
In any case, while his social face can be his most personal possession and the 
center of his security and pleasure, it is only on loan to him from society; it will 
be withdrawn unless he conducts himself in a way that is worthy of it. 
(Goffman 1967: 10) 
Goffman considers it important that a person’s face is accepted by others. Brown and 
Levinson follow Goffman’s approach, defining face as “the public self-image that 
every member wants to claim for himself” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 61). Furthermore, 
they claim that face is something that is “emotionally invested, and that can be lost, 
maintained, or enhanced, and must be constantly attended to in interaction” (1987: 
61). 
Brown and Levinson suggest that every person has two types of face, positive and 
negative. They are considered as two aspects of the concept of face, and they are 
referred to as two dualistic wants. Brown and Levinson (1987: 62) define them as 
follows:  
Negative face: the want of every ‘competent adult member’ that his actions be 
unimpeded by others. 
Positive face: the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least 
some others.  
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In Mey’s interpretation, positive face affirms a person’s status as a free and 
independent agent, while negative face emphasizes a person’s immunity from 
undesirable external interference (Mey 2001: 74). For better understanding of the 
concepts he offers concrete examples stating that positive freedom could be defined 
as “the freedom to express oneself, to vote, to travel, to choose one’s own company”, 
whereas negative freedom means “being free from oppression, from threats to one’s 
safety, from political persecution, police harassment, importuning sales people, and 
so forth” (2001: 74-75). Brown and Levinson argue that this notion of face consisting 
of two aspects is universal, but they recognize that its content is culture-specific and 
“subject of much cultural elaboration” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 13). Spencer-Oatey 
(2000: 14) agrees with the claim of universality in the sense that every individual has 
concerns about face. As regards people’s wants, she states that “[p]eople have a 
fundamental desire for others to evaluate them positively, and so they typically want 
others to acknowledge (explicitly or implicitly) their positive qualities, and not to 
acknowledge their negative qualities” (2000: 14).  
However, there are social interactions when face wants and needs are not 
recognized. These situations can often pose a threat to either the speaker’s or the 
hearer’s face or even to both.  
 
5.3.2 Face-threatening acts and politeness strategies 
 
In every conversation participants have an obligation to save or maintain the faces of 
the other participants they interact with. The term ‘facework’ was introduced by 
Goffman to name this kind of action, and he defines it as “the actions taken by a 
person to make whatever he is doing consistent with face. Face-work serves to 
counteract “incidents” – that is, events whose effective symbolic implications threaten 
face” (Goffman 1967: 12).  
The basic idea of Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory is that “some acts are 
intrinsically threatening to face and thus require ‘softening’” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 
24). According to them, acts that can pose a threat to the hearer’s negative face are 
orders, requests and advice. Those that threat the hearer’s positive face are criticism, 
complaints and disagreements. Acts that pose threats to the speaker’s negative face 
 32 
are making excuses and accepting thanks, whereas apologizing, confessing and 
accepting compliments threaten the speaker’s positive face. 
Face-threatening act (FTA) occurs when an act of communication “run[s] contrary to 
the face wants of the addressee and/or the speaker” (1987: 70). Brown and Levinson 
(1987: 60) suggest the possible speech strategies for reducing or eliminating FTAs. 
They group and number politeness strategies, whereby the higher the number, the 
more polite the strategy is.  
                                                           1. without redressive action, baldly 
                                  on record                                                      2. positive politeness 
       Do the FTA                                  with redressive action  
                                  4. off record                                                  3. negative politeness 
       5. Don’t do the FTA 
Figure 2 Possible strategies for realizing FTAs (Brown & Levinson 1987: 60) 
 
There are four main types of strategies, described by Brown and Levinson, which 
summarize polite behaviour. An important distinction which should be made first is 
between an on record FTA (i.e. strategies 1, 2, and 3) and an off record FTA 
(strategy 4). Brown and Levinson argue that an expression is done on record when it 
“has one unambiguously attributable intention with which witnesses would concur”, 
whereas an off record expression has “more than one unambiguously attributable 
intention” (1987: 69). Locher (2004: 68) further explains the off record strategy, 
stating that when there is more than one possible interpretation of an utterance, it 
leaves open “a way out for both S and H, because S can claim never to have done 
the FTA and H can choose not to understand it”. Strategy 5 is used when the FTA is 
considered to be too threatening to the hearer. Strategy 1, doing an act boldly, 
without redressing FTAs, “involves doing it in the most direct, clear, unambiguous 
and concise way possible” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 69). Doing an act with redress 
(strategies 2 and 3) involves using devices, namely, positive and negative politeness, 
in order to mitigate an FTA. Using positive politeness the speaker is “oriented toward 
the positive face of H, the positive image that he claims for himself”, while using 
negative politeness the speaker is “oriented mainly toward partially satisfying 
(redressing) H’s negative face, his basic want to maintain claims of territory and self-
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determination” (1987: 70). Positive politeness can be performed using the following 
strategies (Brown & Levinson 1987: 103-129): 
Claim common ground: 
Notice, attend to H (his interests, wants, needs, goods) 
Exaggerate (interest, approval, sympathy with H) 
Intensify interest to H 
Use in-group identity markers: in-group language or dialect, jargon, slang, contraction 
or ellipses 
Seek agreement: safe topics, repetition 
Avoid disagreement: token agreement, pseudo-agreement, white lies, hedging 
opinions 
Presuppose/raise/assert common ground: gossip, small talk, point of view 
operations, presupposition manipulations 
Joke 
 
Convey that S and H are co-operators: 
Assert or presuppose S’s knowledge of and concern for H’s wants 
Offer, promise 
Be optimistic 
Include both S and H in the activity 
Give (or ask for) reasons 
Assume or assert reciprocity 
 
Fulfil H’s want for some X: 
Give gifts to H (goods, sympathy, understanding, cooperation) 
 
 
Negative politeness can be expressed using the following strategies (1987: 129-211): 
 
Be indirect: 
Be conventionally indirect 
 
Don’t presume/assume: 
Question, hedge: hedge on illocutionary force, prosodic/kinesic hedges 
 
Don’t coerce H: 
Be pessimistic 
Minimize the imposition, Rx 
Give deference 
 
Communicate S’s want to not impinge on H: 
Apologize: admit the impingement, indicate reluctance, give overwhelming reasons, 
beg forgiveness 
Impersonalize S and H: use performatives, imperatives, impersonal verbs, passive 
and circumstantial voices, replace the pronoun ‘I’ and ‘you’ by indefinites, pluralize 
the ‘I’ and ‘you’ pronouns, use point-of view distancing 
State the FTA as a general rule 
Nominalize 
 
Redress other wants of H’s: 
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Go on the record as incurring a debt, or as not indebting H  
 
 
When choosing a politeness strategy to redress a FTA, the speaker must take into 
account three variables proposed by Brown and Levinson. The variables, which help 
the speaker to estimate the risk of loss of face, are: the social distance (D) of the 
speaker and the hearer, the relative power (P) of the speaker and the hearer, and the 
absolute ranking (R) of impositions in the particular culture (1987: 74). The 
weightiness (Wx), or the risk of loss of face, is measured by adding up the three 
variables, which is decisive in strategy choice. Thus, the formula for calculating the 
weightiness is presented as follows (1987: 76): 
Wx = D (S,H) + P (S,H) + Rx 
The employment of a certain politeness strategy by members of different cultures is 
also dependent on ethos. ‘Ethos’ is a term which Brown and Levinson use to refer to 
“the affective quality of interaction characteristic of members of a society” (1987: 
243). They point out that differences between sociocultural groups can be significant, 
and they are often reflected in people’s choices of communication style which can 
influence ethos. In his work on language, culture and identity, Riley (2007: 213) gives 
an elaborate definition of ethos, where he states the following: 
Ethos is communicative identity. [I] [It refers] to the self-image projected by a 
speaker in and through his or her discourse, but also as it is filtered through 
the hearer’s perceptions, expectations and values, especially as constrained 
by social roles and genres: it is interpreted self-expression, the rhetorical and 
socio-psychological product of mutually influencing communicative behaviours 
and judgements. 
 Brown and Levinson write about cultural ethos, and they claim that certain cultures 
have tendencies toward one politeness strategy more than another. Thus, they 
believe that “in some [positive politeness] societies interactional ethos is generally 
warm, easy-going, friendly; in others [negative politeness societies] it is stiff, formal, 
deferential” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 243).  
 
5.4 Reactions to Brown and Levinson’s Politeness Theory 
 
Brown and Levinson’s face-view of politeness has attracted significant attention, and 
it has been widely studied, receiving both praise and criticism. There are many 
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linguists and reviewers who have found many aspects of Brown and Levinson’s 
theory useful, and it is still considered one of the most important theoretical 
frameworks. 
Nevertheless, there is a number of those who disagree with some areas of Brown 
and Levinson’s theory. Although Brown and Levinson say that their work is based on 
Goffman’s notion of face, some linguists find differences between the two concepts. 
While they see face as a “public self-image”, Goffman characterizes face only as a 
construct “on loan from society”. Mao (1994: 454) argues that “for Goffman, face is a 
‘public property’ that is only assigned to individuals contingent upon their interactional 
behaviour”, whereas “Brown and Levinson characterize face as an image that 
intrinsically belongs to the individual, to the ‘self’”. Additionally, Watts (2003: 105) 
points out that for Brown and Levinson the self is “a stable core of values lodged 
somewhere in the individual”, while Goffman considers it to be constantly 
renegotiable and dependent on social interaction. In relation to that, Mao (1994: 455) 
concludes the following: 
In my view, Goffman’s face is a public, interpersonal image, while Brown and 
Levinson’s face is an individualistic, ‘self’-oriented image. Such a ‘self’-oriented 
characterization of face, which may very well underlie Western interactional 
dynamics, can be problematic in a non-Western context.  
In other words, there are researchers who argue that “Western cultures tend to 
display an individualistic organisation of social structure whereas several Asian, 
African and Islamic cultures are more ‘collectivist’” (Watts 2003: 109). Leech (2006) 
poses a question in the title of his work “Politeness: Is there an East-West divide?” 
where he considers the critique which states that Brown and Levinson’s model has a 
Western bias. The position Leech takes regarding the issue in question is the 
following: 
[I] no, there is no absolute divide between East and West in politeness. 
Consider the concepts of ‘collective, group culture’ (East) and ‘individualist, 
egalitarian culture’ (West). These are not absolutes: they are positions on a 
scale. All polite communication implies that the speaker is taking account of 
both individual and group values. In the East, the group values are more 
powerful, whereas in the West, individual values are. (Leech 2006: 3-4) 
He argues that, although Brown and Levinson claim universality of their model, they 
also put emphasis on cross-cultural/linguistic variation (2006: 3). They express this 
as follows: 
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The essential idea is this: interactional systematics are based largely on 
universal principles. But the application of the principles differs systematically 
across cultures, and within cultures across subcultures, categories and 
groups. (Brown & Levinson 1987: 283) 
Werkhofer (1992) offers a criticism of Brown and Levinson’s model, challenging the 
claim of universality, but with its main interest being the notion of the FTA. He 
focuses on the way the speaker makes his/her choice of an appropriate politeness 
strategy identifying three stages – “generating the intended message”, “estimating 
the risk of threatening face”, “choosing and applying a strategy” – as implied by 
Brown and Levinson (Werkhofer 1992: 164). What Werkhofer argues is that the polite 
utterance that the speaker produces is the result of an internal dialogue that develops 
in the speaker’s mind: 
[T]his model presupposes a specific relationship between ego and alter, 
namely an antagonistic one. This antagonism takes the form of a dialogue, but 
of a strange kind of dialogue that only takes place within the speaker’s mind: 
s/he generates as a first turn, what s/he intends to say. This move remains 
tacit so that the next move is not the addressee’s answer to the first one, but is 
the speaker’s anticipation of what the threat to her or his face would probably 
mean to the addressee. The polite utterance is then the third move or the 
speaker’s second turn in this fictive dialogue. (1992: 165-166) 
With this kind of a linear procedure, as Werkhofer points out, the speaker’s initial 
intention is unconstrained by social considerations. The initial act or intention “does 
not exploit the whole range of possible communicative intentions, but is confined to 
the limited subset of egocentric or face-threatening ones” (1992: 166). Moreover, 
Werkhofer argues against linear processes, stating that linear models rule out 
cyclical processes. In other words, it may happen that during an interaction the 
speaker wants to go back to the initial position and change his mind on what to say 
next, depending on the speaker’s impressions on how the interaction develops and 
“how well s/he fells s/he has been faring so far” (1992: 169). Brown and Levinson’s 
model does not account for this kind of processing which Werkhofer calls ‘cyclic’ or 
‘parallel’, and which “will of course cover linear cases – but not vice versa” (1992: 
169).  
Even though the framework of Brown and Levinson has been challenged by many 
scholars, it still remains the most extensive model of politeness. Watts (2003: 112) 
sees it as “a toolkit to compare and interpret the ways in which speakers handle a 
range of different speech events across a range of different cultures”. 
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5.5 Watts’ politic behaviour 
 
Richard Watts’ approach to linguistic politeness is marked by the introduction of the 
notion of politic verbal behaviour to refer to a broader concept of socially appropriate 
behaviour. Watts (2003: 4) stresses the importance of the distinction between first-
order politeness and second-order politeness. They present two ideologies of 
politeness and they refer to the different ways politeness phenomena are explained. 
For Watts (2003: 3) “first-order politeness [...] correspond[s] to the various ways in 
which polite behaviour is perceived and talked about by members of socio-cultural 
groups”, and he refers to this as “folk” or “lay interpretation” of politeness. Second-
order politeness is “a theoretical construct, a term within a theory of social behaviour 
and language usage”, or simply called “technical interpretation”. In other words, fist-
order politeness (politeness1) is a concept used for different ways in which members 
of social and cultural groups interpret polite language usage, whereas second-order 
politeness (politeness2) refers to a theoretical notion. Accordingly, Watts uses the 
term ‘politic’ as a second-order concept, and he defines politic behaviour as 
that behaviour, linguistic and nonlinguistic, which the participants construct as 
being appropriate to the ongoing social interaction. (Watts 2003: 20) 
The definition can be illustrated by the following examples: 
 (1) A: Would you like some more coffee? 
B: Yes, please. 
     (Watts 2003: 186) 
(2) A: Sorry, would you mind moving along a bit? 
B: Of course. No trouble at all. 
      (Watts 2003: 187)  
 
Watts explains that what has been termed in other politeness theories as polite 
behaviour is seen as politic behaviour in his approach.  Brown and Levinson’s forms 
of politeness are seen as part of Watts’ politic behaviour. He further argues that 
politic behaviour consists of “mutually shared forms of consideration for others”, and 
it is regulated by unspoken conventions which are culturally specific (2003: 28). 
According to Watts, politeness theory should be able to “locate possible realisations 
of polite or impolite behaviour and offer a way of assessing how the members 
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themselves may have evaluated that behaviour” (2003: 19-20). His purpose is to 
show that politeness1 is evaluative in nature, and he explains that 
[l]inguistic behaviour which is perceived to be beyond what is expectable, i.e. 
salient behaviour, should be called polite or impolite depending on whether the 
behaviour itself tends towards the negative or positive end of the spectrum of 
politeness. (2003: 19) 
In order to provide an illustration, Watts’ example (1) could be modified: 
 (3) A: Would you like some more coffee? 
B: Yes, please, that’s very kind of you, coffee would be nice. 
According to Watts, when a person’s behaviour in a certain situation meets with other 
people’s expectations, this is called politic behaviour. To show that politic behaviour 
is not equivalent to polite behaviour, he offers an example of a situation in a theatre 
when a person who has bought two tickets numbered 51 and 52 finds those seats 
already taken by some other people. Some of the possible responses of the ticket-
holder of seats 51 and 52 could be: 
(4) a. Excuse me. I think you’re sitting in our seats. 
(5) b. Excuse me but those are our seats. 
(6) c. I’m sorry. I think there must be some mistake. 
(7) d. I’m sorry, but are you sure you’ve got the right seats? 
        (Watts 2003: 257) 
But if the reaction is the following: 
(8) I’m so sorry to bother you, but would you very much mind vacating our 
seats? 
         (Watts 2003: 257) 
it is justified from the point of view of the ticket-holder, but it is beyond what is 
expected by the people sitting in those seats, who could consider the behaviour 
unnecessarily aggressive, “but at the same time polite” (2003: 258). However, if we 
assume that an utterance similar to (a – d) is produced in this situation, it is likely that 
the people occupying the seats would start a negotiation in order to find the source of 
the mistake. For Watts (2003: 258), “this kind of negotiation sequence constitutes 
politic behaviour”, and it is something that the participants would expect to happen in 
this situation, “and it is not therefore polite”. 
Even though Watts argues that politic and polite behaviour are two different notions, 
“certain utterances that lie within the scope of politic behaviour may indeed be open 
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to interpretation as polite” (2003: 258).  He stresses that there is no objective method 
by which it can be predicted which forms of behaviour will be considered politic. 
 
5.6 Social variables – power and distance 
 
People construct their self-image through everyday conversation and interaction. The 
way they develop their face depends on social relationships they enter and on daily 
activities they are involved in together with other people. Through these activities and 
in relation to others is how an individual is defined, and this is also the setting for the 
occurrence and experience of social differences. Many researchers dealing with 
politeness have considered the influence of these differences, namely social power 
and distance, on linguistic output.  
In their classic article on social power, French and Raven (1968) identify five most 
important bases of power, which are responsible for different effects of social 
influence. They consider the relationship between and agent (O) and a person (P). 
The five bases are: 
Reward power, based on P’s perception that O has the ability to mediate 
rewards for him; 
Coercive power, based on P’s perception that O has the ability to mediate 
punishments for him; 
Legitimate power, based on the perception by P that O has a legitimate right to 
prescribe behaviour for him; 
Referent power, based on P’s identification with O; 
Expert power, based on the perception that O has some special knowledge or 
expertness. (French & Raven 1968: 263) 
This kind of classification is especially significant in empirical work when it is 
necessary to compare behaviour of interactants where it is assumed that power plays 
an important role in communication. However, not only power, but also social 
distance is widely used in pragmatics research, particularly in the study of politeness.  
Brown and Gilman (1972) were among the first ones who helped establish power and 
distance as key variables. They offer the following definition of power:    
One person may be said to have power over another in the degree that he is 
able to control the behavior of the other. Power is a relationship between at 
least two persons, and it is nonreciprocal in the sense that both cannot have 
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power in the same area of behavior. (Brown & Gilman 1972: 225, quoted in 
Spencer-Oatey 2000: 34) 
As we have seen, Brown and Levinson use social distance, relative power and 
ranking of imposition in their weightiness formula to account for cultural variations 
(5.3.2). While they regard status as part of their relative power variable, Watts (1991) 
considers it a variable closely related to power: 
[Status] refer[s] to an individual’s position in the structure of social 
relationships with respect to other individuals. Position may be determined in a 
number of ways, through education, wealth, age, sex, etc., or by the 
possession of specific mental or physical abilities. Status is thus dependent on 
the set of values attached to these and many other features by the culture 
concerned, and it is crucially involved in systems of social hierarchies which 
help to determine who possesses greater potential power in what social 
activities. It thus fluctuates from culture to culture and, within a culture, from 
social group to social group. (Watts 1991: 55) 
Watts argues that “status is a prerequisite of power but it is not necessarily co-
extensive with it” because a person may choose not to exercise power over others 
(1991: 176). 
Both power and distance are variables considered to have significant influence 
on language use, and there are numerous empirical studies which have 
confirmed that (e.g. Blum-Kulka et al. 1985, Beebe & Takahashi 1989, 
Olshtain 1989). Brown and Levinson (1987: 77) define power as “the degree to 
which H can impose his own plans and his own self-evaluation (face) at the 
expense of S’s plans and self-evaluation”.  
Brown and Levinson (1987: 77) define social distance as being “based on an 
assessment of the frequency of interaction and the kinds of material or non-material 
goods (including face) exchanged between S and H”. Thomas (1985: 780) argues 
that “in a situation in which the social distance between speaker and hearer is great, 
there is likely to be a corresponding increase in the degree of indirectness 
employed”. Her definition of this variable is as follows: 
[Social distance] is best seen as a composite of psychologically real factors 
(status, age, sex, degree of intimacy, etc.) which ‘together determine the 
overall degree of respectfulness’ within a given speech situation. In other 
words, if you feel close to someone, because that person is related to you, or 
you know him or her well or are similar in terms of age, social class, 
occupation, sex, ethnicity, etc., you feel less need to employ indirectness in, 
say, making a request than you would if you were making the same request of 
a complete stranger. (Thomas 1995: 128) 
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For the parameter of distance many different labels are used: closeness, familiarity, 
solidarity, relational intimacy (Spencer-Oatey 1996: 3). One of the problems that 
exist, as Wierzbicka (2003: 70) points out, is that there is a lack of agreement 
between researchers as to the terminology and meaning of variables. She argues 
that they use various terms in their research without explaining what they mean by 
them. Since this can create confusion, it is important to pay attention to the number 
of basic dimensions of interpersonal relationships, as well as to the terms and 
concepts of these dimensions (Spencer-Oatey 1996, Wierzbicka 2003). 
The empirical part of this thesis will consider power and distance as variables which 
may affect the speaker’s choice of strategies when conveying the speech act of 
apologizing. 
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6 Speech acts 
 
When people communicate with each other, they perform speech acts, such as 
asking questions, making requests, giving orders, and so on. This idea represented 
John Searle’s original hypothesis in 1969 when he wrote Speech Acts: An Essay in 
the Philosophy of language. In his work Searle (1969: 16) argues that “all linguistic 
communication involves linguistic acts”, and “these acts are in general made possible 
by and are performed in accordance with certain rules for the use of linguistic 
elements”. Moreover, he states that 
[t]he unit of linguistic communication is not, as has generally been supposed, 
the symbol, word or sentence, or even the token of the symbol, word or 
sentence, but rather the production or issuance of the symbol or word or 
sentence in the performance of the speech act. (1969: 16) 
John Searle’s work appeared as a follow-up on John Austin’s (1962) ideas on 
illocutionary acts, and as a response to Austin’s call for a general theory of speech 
acts. This chapter looks into both Austin’s and Searle’s theories and classifications of 
illocutionary acts. 
 
6.1 John Austin 
 
The philosopher John Langshaw Austin was interested in the range of things people 
can do using words. What one communicates depends not only on the literal 
meaning of what is uttered, but also on the speaker’s intentions and the 
circumstances under which the social interaction occurs. In How to do things with 
words (1962) Austin showed how people use language not just to say things, but to 
perform actions. 
Austin’s approach is considered to be partly a reaction to logical positivism, whose 
central tenet is the verifiability principle. According to this principle, the validity and 
meaning of a statement depends on whether it can be verified or not. Therefore, if a 
proposition cannot be verified it is considered invalid and meaningless. Austin’s 
opposition consisted of the idea that not all utterances can be seen as either true or 
false, and that some utterances are used for more than simply stating the facts. 
Observing that there are also utterances in forms of questions, exclamations or 
 43 
wishes, Austin argues that they “do not ‘describe’ or ‘report’ or constate anything at 
all, are not ‘true’ or ‘false’” (Austin 1962: 5). 
Austin’s theory started with his description, and later the rejection, of a distinction 
between constatives and performatives. He defines a constative as an utterance 
which is either true or false, and a performative as “the doing of an action” (Austin 
1962: 3-5). For example, by uttering ‘I do’ one performs the act of marrying (1962: 5-
6). This kind of utterances are neither true nor false, but could be described as 
‘happy’ (felicitous) or ‘unhappy’ (infelicitous), depending on how successfully they 
perform the given action. In order for a performative to be successful or felicitous it 
must follow a set of conventions and be uttered in appropriate context. If any of the 
rules is broken, then the act presented by the utterance is not achieved. To return to 
the example - if the person uttering “I do” is already married, then the action of 
marrying cannot be conducted, and such performative falls under ‘infelicities’ (1962: 
14-16).  
However, Austin realizes that definite distinction between constatives and 
performatives is not easy to make because, for example, there are performatives 
which are at the same time (in)felicitous and true/false. He states that “there is 
danger of our initial and tentative distinction between constative and performative 
utterances breaking down” (1962: 54), and he decides that a fresh start on the 
problem is needed: 
We want to reconsider more generally the senses in which to say something 
may be to do something, or in saying something we do something (and also 
perhaps to consider the different case in which by saying something we do 
something). (1962: 91) 
While abandoning the constative/performative distinction due to many problems, 
Austin takes a different approach, and turns to speech act theory. In Austin’s words, 
by producing an utterance one is performing a locutionary act. That further means 
that saying something is to perform 
a) phonetic act – the act of uttering certain noises; 
b) phatic act – the act of uttering certain vocables or words, i.e. noises of 
certain types, belonging to and as belonging to a certain vocabulary, 
conforming to and as conforming to a certain grammar; 
c) rhetic act – the act of using those vocables with a certain more-or-less 
definite sense and reference. (1962: 95) 
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When someone’s locutionary act is being reported, the focus can be on the phatic 
act, whereby the uttered words are just quoted producing direct speech; or the focus 
can be placed on the rhetic act, thus producing indirect speech (1962: 96). 
Performing a locutionary act the speaker is also performing an illocutionary act, i.e. 
“an act in saying something” (1962: 99). Austin explains the illocutionary act in the 
sense of its functions in language, pointing out that the utterance has its illocutionary 
force if performed felicitously (e.g. ordering, informing, warning). According to Austin, 
the illocutionary force lies beyond words and is rooted in convention. Some linguists 
argue that there is little theory in Austin’s lectures on the nature of such a convention, 
but believe that he refers to a shared knowledge “with regard to the relation of form 
and meaning of the expression in question (possibly together with contextual clues)” 
(Witczak-Plisiecka 2009: 91). 
The third type of act is perlocutionary act, which refers to the effect the utterance has 
on the hearers. Austin (1962: 101) notes that “[s]aying something will often, or even 
normally, produce certain consequential effects upon the feeling, thoughts, or actions 
of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons”. The distinction between the 
locution, illocution and perlocution can be made clearer with the help of the following 
examples cited after Austin (1962: 101-102): 
 a) Locution 
He said to me ‘Shoot her!’ meaning by ‘shoot’ shoot and referring by ‘her’ to 
her. 
 b) Illocution 
He urged (or advised, ordered, &c.) me to shoot her. 
c) Perlocution 
He persuaded me to shoot her. / He got me to (or made me, &c.) shoot her. 
Austin characterizes illocutionary acts as acts which involve the uptake effect. He 
writes the following: 
Unless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary act will not have been 
happily, successfully performed. [I] I cannot be said to have warned an 
audience unless it hears what I say and takes what I say in a certain sense. 
[I] So the performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake. 
(1962: 115-116) 
However, Austin emphasizes that the effects produced by illocutionary acts should 
be distinguished from the effects produced by perlocutionary acts. The main features 
of illocutionary acts are securing uptake, taking effect, and inviting responses, 
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whereas achieving an object (e.g. persuading someone) and producing a sequel 
(e.g. warning may achieve the sequel of alarming someone) are features of 
perlocutionary acts (1962: 120). 
In his theory, Austin focused on illocutionary acts, developing a taxonomy of five 
types of illocutions according to their illocutionary force: verdictives, exercitives, 
commissives, behabitives and expositives (1962: 150). Verdictives refer to the giving 
of a verdict or a judgement (e.g. acquit, convict, estimate). Exercitives mean the 
exercising of powers, rights or influence (e.g. appoint, order, advise). Commissives 
involve the acts of promising or undertaking (e.g. promise, intend, agree). 
Behabitives have to do with attitudes and social behaviour (e.g. apologize, thank, 
criticize). Expositives refer to clarifying of arguments, reasons and communications 
(e.g. report, deny, inform) (1962: 150-162). 
However, Austin was not completely satisfied with this classification of utterances, 
and he suggested that “some fresh classification altogether [was] needed”, admitting 
that  
[b]ehabitives are troublesome because they seem too miscellaneous 
altogether: and expositives because they are enormously numerous and 
important, and seem both to be included in the other classes and at the same 
time to be unique in a way that I have not succeeded in making clear even to 
myself. (1962: 151) 
Austin’s suggestion for some further work on illocutionary acts was accepted by his 
student John R. Searle. 
 
6.2 John Searle 
 
Searle developed speech act theory to explain the rules which govern the production 
of utterances. In his work Speech acts (1969) Searle accepts Austin’s understanding 
of the speech act as the basic linguistic unit of meaning and force. However, he 
rejects his distinction between the locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary act, 
and instead develops different dimensions of the speech act. Additionally, Searle 
proposes a new taxonomy of illocutionary acts, and introduces the notion of indirect 
speech acts. 
According to Searle (1969: 24-25), there are four basic acts performed in uttering a 
sentence, and these are: 
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a) Uttering words (morphemes, sentences) = performing utterance acts. 
b) Referring and predicating = performing propositional acts. 
c) Stating, questioning, commanding, promising, etc. = performing 
illocutionary acts. 
d) To these three notions I now wish to add Austin's notion of the 
perlocutionary act. Correlated with the notion of illocutionary acts is the 
notion of the consequences or effects such acts have on the actions, 
thoughts, or beliefs, etc. of hearers. For example, by arguing I may 
persuade or convince someone, by warning him I may scare or alarm him, 
by making a request I may get him to do something, by informing him I may 
convince him (enlighten, edify, inspire him, get him to realize). The 
italicized expressions above denote perlocutionary acts. 
Searle explains the utterance act as “consist[ing] simply in uttering strings of words”, 
whereas “[i]llocutionary and propositional acts consist characteristically in uttering 
words in sentences in certain contexts, under certain conditions and with certain 
intentions” (1969: 24-25).  
The major difference from Austin’s approach is Searle’s introduction of the 
propositional act. One characteristic of the propositional act is that it cannot occur 
alone, but only in connection to the performance of an illocutionary act. In Searle’s 
words, “one cannot just refer and predicate without making an assertion or asking a 
question or performing some other illocutionary act” (1969: 25). The propositional act 
consists of two components – a referential act and predication. According to Searle, 
the referential act is a complete act by which a speaker identifies an object, process 
or action, whereas predication is not a separate speech act, but only a component of 
it: 
Even though reference is an abstraction from the total illocutionary act, it is a 
separate speech act. By analogy, moving the knight is an abstraction from 
playing chess (because it only counts as moving the knight if you are playing 
chess), but it is still a separate act. Predication is also an abstraction, but it is 
not a separate act. It is a slice from the total illocutionary act; just as indicating 
the illocutionary force is not a separate act, but another slice from the 
illocutionary act. (1969: 122-123). 
Searle’s hypothesis is that “speaking a language is performing acts according to 
rules” (1969: 36-37). Additionally, “speech acts are acts characteristically performed 
by uttering expressions in accordance with [the] sets of constitutive rules” (1969: 37). 
In order to invoke the underlying rules for the successful performance of a speech 
act, Searle sets the conditions for the performance of a particular illocutionary act. 
Here are the rules for the illocutionary act of promising (1969: 63): 
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Propositional content rule:  
Pr is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence (or larger stretch of 
discourse) T, the utterance of which predicates some future act A of the 
speaker S. 
Preparatory rules:  
Pr is to be uttered only if the hearer H would prefer S’s doing A to his not doing 
A, and S believes hearer H would prefer S’s doing A to his not doing A. 
Pr is to be uttered only if it is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A in the 
normal course of events. 
Sincerity rule: 
Pr is to be uttered only if S intends to do A. 
Essential rule: 
The utterance of Pr counts as the undertaking of an obligation to do A.  
According to Searle, propositional content rule specifies which propositional content 
of the speech act is acceptable; preparatory rules specify contextual requirements 
with regard to social relations, beliefs and desires of the interlocutors; sincerity rule 
specifies the speaker’s psychological state regarding the propositional content of the 
utterance; essential rule specifies the type of illocutionary act performed by the 
utterance. 
 
6.2.1 Searle’s taxonomy 
 
Searle considered Austin’s classification of illocutionary acts deficient, so he 
proposed his own taxonomy in his paper “A the classification of illocutionary acts” 
(1976). 
In Searle’s view, the main weaknesses of Austin’s approach are the following: 
[T]here is a persistent confusion between verbs and acts, not all the verbs are 
illocutionary verbs, there is too much overlap of the categories, too much 
heterogeneity within the categories, many of the verbs listed in the categories 
don't satisfy the definition given for the category and, most important, there is 
no consistent principle of classification. (Searle 1976: 9-10) 
Arguing that his taxonomy is based on essential conditions, Searle proposes the 
basic categories of illocutionary acts. In order to group and sort them, he chooses the 
following three most important criteria: 
1. Differences in the point (or purpose) of the (type of) act 
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2. Differences in the direction of the fit between words and the world 
3. Differences in expressed psychological states (1976: 2-8) 
The first criterion is what Searle calls ‘illocutionary point’, and it refers to what the 
speaker is trying to do with the utterance. For example, the illocutionary point of an 
apology is to express the speaker’s regret for having done an act; the illocutionary 
point of a promise is to commit the speaker to doing an act (Searle & Vanderveken 
1985: 14).  
The second criterion refers to the relation between the uttered words and the world. It 
can have two directions: the word-to-world direction, when the propositional content 
matches the world (statements, descriptions, assertions), and the world-to-word 
direction, when the world matches the propositional content (promises, commands, 
requests). More specifically, the former direction reflects the way the speaker 
truthfully represents the world with the uttered illocution, whereas the latter reflects 
the speaker’s subsequent behaviour which is supposed to fit the proposition. Searle 
(1976: 4) explains that “[d]irection of fit is always a consequence of illocutionary 
point”.  
The third criterion refers to the speaker’s psychological state or attitude to the 
propositional content expressed in the performance of the illocution. The 
psychological states correspond to the sincerity conditions, and are reflected in the 
speaker’s wants, intentions, beliefs.  
On the basis of these three and several other criteria, Searle postulates his 
taxonomy, which is presented bellow: 
Representatives – the speaker is committed to the truth of the expressed 
proposition. Verbs denoting representatives: assert, inform, report, conclude. 
Directives – attempts by the speaker to get the hearer to do something. Verbs 
denoting directives: request, command, permit, invite. 
Commissives – attempt to commit the speaker to some future course of action. 
Verbs denoting commissives: warn, promise, threaten. 
Expressives – attempts to express psychological state specified in the 
propositional content. Verbs denoting expressives: apologize, thank, 
congratulate, welcome. 
Declarations – attempts to bring about changes in the status or condition of 
objects. Examples: performing the act of marrying, declaring a state of war. 
(1976: 10-14) 
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Even though Austin was the first one to construct a taxonomy of illocutionary acts, 
and there have also been other attempts at classification later (e.g. Bach & Harnish 
1979), Searle’s taxonomy has been most widely discussed. 
 
6.2.2 Indirect speech acts 
 
The core element of successful communication is understanding the intentions 
behind utterances. There are instances when the speaker utters a sentence and 
means exactly what he says, but he may also mean “another illocution with a 
different propositional content” (Searle 1975: 59-60). Searle has introduced the 
notion of indirect speech act and his explanation of it is as follows: 
In indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he 
actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background 
information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, together with the general powers 
of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer. (1975: 60-61) 
According to Searle, the necessary apparatus for explaining indirect speech acts is a 
theory of speech acts, general principles of cooperative conversation, mutually 
shared background information of the speaker and the hearer, and the ability of the 
hearer to make inferences. 
To explain the phenomenon of indirection, Searle introduces the terms ‘primary’ and 
‘secondary’ illocutionary act. The primary illocutionary act refers to the indirect 
illocution, while the secondary illocutionary act is the direct one, literally performed. 
Searle (1975: 61) considers the following example: 
(9) Student X: Let’s go to the movies tonight. 
Student Y: I have to study for an exam. 
The primary illocutionary act in this example is Y’s rejection of the X’s proposal, 
whereas the secondary illocutionary act is Y’s statement that he/she has to prepare 
for an exam. Searle tries to explain how a person can mean two things by producing 
one utterance, as well as the way the hearer recognizes the intended meaning, i.e. 
the primary illocution in a given situation. He proposes ten steps necessary to derive 
the primary illocution, and here they are based on Searle’s example given above: 
 Step 1 Understanding the facts of the interaction. 
 Step 2 Assuming cooperation (principles of conversational cooperation). 
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Step 3 Determining factual background information (e.g. a relevant response 
must be one of acceptance, rejection, counterproposal, etc.) 
Step 4 Making conclusions resulting from steps 1-3 (the literal meaning does 
not fit the relevant response). 
 Step 5 Assuming that primary illocution differs from the literal illocution. 
This is a crucial step: unless a hearer is able to distinguish primary from literal 
illocutions, he cannot understand indirect illocutions. 
Step 6 Considering shared, factual background information (studying for an 
exam takes much time, just as going to the movies takes a large amount of 
time). 
Step 7 Making an inference from Step 6 (the hearer might not be able to both 
study and go to the movies in one evening). 
Step 8 From speech act theory: a preparatory condition on the acceptance of 
a proposal is the ability to carry out the proposed act. 
Step 9 Inferring from Steps 1, 7 and 8 (the hearer’s utterance probably means 
that he/she cannot accept the proposal). 
Step 10 Inferring from 5 and 9 (the hearer’s primary illocutionary point is 
probably to reject the proposal). 
This is the method that Searle develops in order to reconstruct the process of 
inferring the primary illocutionary point. 
Searle (1975: 74) argues that “the chief motivation – though not the only motivation – 
for using these indirect forms is politeness”, and he explains this as follows: 
[I] [O]rdinary conversational requirements of politeness normally make it 
awkward to issue flat imperative sentences (e.g. “Leave the room”) or explicit 
performatives (e.g. “I order you to leave the room”), and we therefore seek to 
find indirect means to our illocutionary ends (e.g. “I wonder if you would mind 
leaving the room”). In directives, politeness is the chief motivation for 
indirectness. (1975: 64) 
Searle’s notion of indirect speech acts served as a base for many further works on 
speech acts, one of them being Olshtain and Cohen’s (1983) proposition of a speech 
act set of apologizing. The following chapters introduce apologies and examine their 
use in interlanguage. 
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7 Apologies 
 
In cross-cultural pragmatics apologies are, along with requests, the most frequently 
analysed speech acts. A possible reason for this interest in apologies could be found 
in their function of repairing and maintaining social harmony.  
Apologies are usually called for when social norms have been violated, and when 
there is a need to “set things right” (Olshtain & Cohen 1983: 20). However, in order 
for an apology to take place, the speaker has to believe that an act of violation has 
been performed prior to the moment of speaking and that the result of the act has 
caused offence to another person who now deserves an apology (Olshtain & Cohen 
1989: 55). 
 
7.1 Defining apology 
 
According to The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) (1993), the term ‘apology’ is 
derived from the Greek term apoloyia, meaning defence or a speech in ones’ own 
defence. It dates back to the sixteenth century when it was used to mean the 
following: 
The pleading off from a charge or imputation, whether expressed, implied, or 
only conceived as possible; defence of a person, or vindication of an 
institution, etc., from accusation or aspersion. (OED 1993) 
This early meaning of apologies seemed similar to justifications and explanations. 
But a more modern usage of the term refers to apology as to 
[a]n explanation offered to a person affected by one’s action that no offence 
was intended, couples with the expression of regret for any that may have 
been given or, a frank acknowledgement of the offence with expression of 
regret for it, by way of reparation. (OED 2004) 
Goffman (1971: 140) refers to apologies as to remedial and ritual work which “allows 
the participants to go on their way, if not with satisfaction that matters are closed, 
then at least with the right to act as if they feel that matters are closed and that ritual 
equilibrium has been restored”.  
In Leech’s terms, apologies express regret for an offence which is committed by the 
speaker against the hearer (Leech 1983: 124-125). He furthermore explains: 
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[I] [A]n apology implies a transaction, in that it is a bid to change the balance-
sheet of the relation between s and h. If the apology is successful, it will result 
in h’s pardoning or excusing the offence. Significantly, if we commit an offence 
against someone, we talk of owing that person an apology, thereby treating 
the apology as in some sense an expiation of the offence. The metaphor 
whereby deeds make us ‘debtors’ or ‘creditors’ of one another applies not only 
to good deeds (favours), but also to bad deeds (offences), so that apologizing 
[I] can be regarded as an acknowledgement of an imbalance in the relation 
between s and h, and to some extent, as an attempt to restore the equilibrium. 
As the definition makes clear, apology is a speech act performed by an offender, with 
a focus on the person affected by a committed act.  
 
7.2 Apology and face 
 
There is a lack of consensus as to whether it is the hearer’s or the speaker’s face 
that apologies redress, and also to the type of politeness apologies involve 
(Ogiermann 2009: 49). 
Brown and Levinson classify apologies as negative politeness strategies, i.e. 
strategies focusing on the hearer’s right to be “unimpeded by others” (Brown & 
Levinson 1987). When the speaker apologizes, as Olshtain and Cohen (1990: 46-47) 
explain, he/she is “willing to humiliate him/herself to some extent and to admit to fault 
and responsibility for [a violation]”. Therefore, in Brown and Levinson’s terms, the act 
of apologizing is face-saving for the hearer, and face-threatening for the speaker. 
Similar view is offered by Holmes (1990: 159), who defines apology as “a speech act 
addressed to B’s face-needs and intended to remedy an offence for which A takes 
responsibility, and thus to restore equilibrium between A and B”.  
However, the issue of face in relation to apologies can be looked at not only from the 
hearer’s perspective but also from the speaker’s. This view is provided by Meier 
(1992: 31), who focuses on the redress of the speaker’s face and not the hearer’s: 
Apologies or remedial work (e.g., apologies, excuses, justifications, etc.) within 
this view, are not then viewed as politeness phenomena co-occurring with 
some other face-threatening act. They are rather an attempt to remedy any 
damage incurred to image upon a responsibility linkage between an actor and 
inappropriate behavior. Contrary to Brown and Levinson, I posit remedial work 
as a face-saving device as regards S (not H). Concern for H’s face is only a 
by-product of the attempt to serve the intent of saving S’s face. S’s image, 
thus, becomes the central one. The intent of remedial work then is the repair of 
S’s image. 
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Meier (2004: 3) presents a model of apology, putting the speaker at the centre of it, 
which is illustrated in the figure bellow: 
S’s image => S’s linkage to a norm violation => S’s damaged image => 
apology => S’s repaired image. 
According to Meier (2004: 3-4) apologies serve as a tool for image maintenance, and 
she further explains: 
The major motivating force behind an apology is thus the status of the 
speaker’s image in the eyes of the hearer, who is the arbiter of the 
appropriateness or effectiveness of particular apology strategies for a given 
situation. 
In Meier’s opinion, apologies are mostly viewed as hearer-supportive in accordance 
with Brown and Levinson’s “almost exclusive concern with H’s face” (1995b: 383). 
However, she observes that Leech (1983) classifies apologies as positive politeness 
strategies, and also Holmes (1990) takes speaker’s positive face into consideration. 
Holmes stresses the function of apologies which incorporates “an attempt to 
simultaneously redress the speaker's positive face needs as well as the victim’s face 
needs” (Holmes 1990: 162). The following example offered by Holmes (1990: 162) 
illustrates such a situation: 
 (10) [A is phoning B to warn her of potential inconvenience.]  
A: I’m sorry but I’m going to be a bit late for work. The buses aren’t off 
strike yet and with it being a wet Friday, it’ll probably be a while until my 
taxi arrives.  
B: Uh-huh as long as you’re here by six, cos I’m going then. 
In this interaction the speaker A is addressing the speaker B’s possible face loss (I’m 
sorry), but he/she is also attempting to redress his/her positive face loss by including 
an explanation of why the offence is not possible to avoid. 
Holmes (1990: 162) also points out to instances when there is an attempt by the 
speaker at redressing the hearer’s positive face: 
(11) [Introducing B to C, A has used Mr. instead of Dr. for B.]  
A: Oh I am sorry – it’s Dr. Hall not Mr. Forgive me.  
[B smiles in an embarrassed way and addresses C.]  
B: Nice to meet you.  
Although we have seen how an offer of apology can amend the speaker’s face, it is 
also able to make the speaker appear weak. In her article “Apologies: What it Means 
 54 
to Say ‘Sorry’”, Deborah Tannen (1998) discusses the situation when President 
Clinton made his testimony regarding the Lewinsky affair, after which he was 
criticized by the press for not having been apologetic enough. Tannen refers to his 
implicit form of apology, explaining that more explicit apology would have probably 
weakened his position. On the other hand, she argues that “[t]hough many people 
resist apologizing because it appears weak, willingness to apologize can be a sign of 
strength, precisely because it shows that the apologizer is confident enough to risk 
appearing weak” (Tannen 1998). 
Ogiermann (2009: 53) comes to the conclusion that there are offences which can 
cause damage to both positive and negative face, and since the speaker and the 
hearer have both face types, “a remedial interchange can affect up to four faces”. In 
order to illustrate the performance of an apology including all four faces, Ogiermann 
offers the chart presented bellow: 
    OFFENCE              sometimes followed by a: 
    complaint or confession 
 
        Damage to Hearer’s                                                              Damage to Speaker’s 
 
 
negative face        positive face               ← mutual wants →              positive face 
 
 
  
 Damage to Speaker’s  
       Restoration of negative face 
 
    APOLOGY 
 
Figure 3 Face considerations involved in remedial interchanges  
(Ogiermann 2009: 54) 
 
 
7.3 The form of apology 
 
Apologies have been explored by many authors such as Fraser (1981), Olshtain and 
Cohen (1983), Owen (1983), Trosborg (1987), Deutschmann (2003) who were 
concerned with investigating the form of apologies. 
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Olshtain and Cohen (1983: 21) state that the act of apologizing includes two basic 
components: the recipient and the apologizer. The participant in interaction who has 
caused the offence needs to apologize to the offended person. However, it may 
happen that the offender does not perceive him/herself as guilty for the offence, and 
may not feel the need to apologize. The following section deals with some major 
response categories which are employed in the performance of apologies. 
According to Deutschmann (2003: 44) an apology includes four basic components, 
and these are: the offender, the offended, the offence and the remedy. The offender 
is the person who takes responsibility for some offence; the offended is the victim of 
an offence, but does not necessarily perceive him/herself as offended; the offence is 
the incident which merits the apology; and the most important component is the 
remedy, which is a “recognition of the offence, acceptance of responsibility and a 
display of regret” (Deutschmann 2003: 46).  
 
7.4 Apology strategies 
 
The offender’s perception of the degree of the severity of the offence is only one of 
the factors which influence his/her decision about whether to apologize or not, or 
which apology strategy to use. The following factors, as claimed by Olshtain and 
Cohen (1983: 21), influence the apologizer’s choice of semantic formulas: 
1. The recipient’s expectations determined by his evaluation of the degree of 
severity of the offence. 
2. The offender’s apology determined by her perception of the degree of severity 
of the offence. 
3. The offender’s apology controlled by the extent of compunction expected from 
the recipient. 
4. The interactive nature of both the initial apology and the recipient’s response. 
5. The social status of the two participants. 
6. The way the tone of voice may function to convey meaning. 
But before discussing semantic formulas of the apology speech act, Olshtain and 
Cohen (1983: 22) stress the importance of making the distinction between the case 
when the offender is positively inclined to apologize as opposed to the case when 
he/she does not accept responsibility for the offence.  
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7.4.1 Avoiding responsibility 
 
In her work “Apology strategies in natives/non-natives” Trosborg (1987: 149-150) 
considers strategies for opting out, i.e. situations when the offender does not take on 
responsibility and decides not to apologize. She refers to an apology as a response 
to a complaint, but she notes that not every complaint is followed by an apology, and 
also “the recipient of an apology may or may not have been complaining” (1994: 374-
375). Accordingly, Trosborg identifies three ‘Roles’ in a complaint-apology situation, 
and these are: complainer, complainee or apologizer, and a complainable (i.e. the 
offence in question) (1987: 148). The following figure displays the major categories of 
opting out found in the data which Trosborg obtained in her experiment. The 
complainee either denies that the offence has occurred (0.1) and (0.2), or he/she 
denies his/her responsibility, either by justifying his/her actions (0.3), or by blaming 
someone else (0.4) and (0.5).  
 
 
Complainee does not take on responsibility 
 
Does not accept that                                     Accepts that the 
the complainable has occurred                     complainable has occurred 
 
 
Explicit  Implicit               Justification                    Blame 
Denial denial                  (0.3) 
(0.1) (0.2) 
                                                                                         Blames X                   Blames the 
                                                                                         (0.4)                           complainer                 
      ‘attack’ (0.5) 
 
 
Figure 4 Strategies of opting out (Trosborg 1987: 149) 
 
 
According to Trosborg (1987: 149-150), explicit denial of responsibility (0.1) refers to 
the complainee’s denial of an offence having occurred or of having any responsibility 
for it. The complainee may use arguments, such as “I know nothing about it, I can 
assure you”, or “strategic disarmers”, such as “You know that I would never do a 
thing like that”. Implicit denial of responsibility (0.2) is a strategy which includes the 
complainee’s ignoring a complaint or talking about something else. By offering 
justification (0.3) the complainee provides arguments to persuade the complainer that 
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“no blame can be attached to him” (1987: 149). Blaming someone else (0.4) refers to 
the complainee’s attempt to evade responsibility by blaming the complainer or a third 
party for the offence. Another way of evading responsibility may be to attack the 
complainer (0.5) if the complainee “lacks an adequate defence for his own behaviour” 
(1987: 149). 
Apart from the five strategies presented by Trosborg, there is another one which can 
be found in the CCSARP coding manual by Blum-Kulka and Olshtain (1984) (see 
section 3.2). They list “Pretend to be offended” as one of the strategies the offender 
may use when refusing to acknowledge guilt. This can be done by saying things such 
as “I’m the one to be offended” (Blum-Kulka et al. 1989: 292). However, similarities 
can be found between this one and Trosborg’s strategy (0.4).  
These are many of the possible responses that the offender may make in situations 
when he/she is not willing to offer an apology, and instead chooses to deny any 
involvement in the offensive act that has taken place. The following section deals 
with the case when the apologizer decides to express responsibility for the offence, 
and it describes the forms of the realization of the act of apologizing. 
 
7.4.2 Apology speech act set 
 
On the basis of Fraser’s (1980) list of semantic formulas, associated with the speech 
act of apologizing, Olshtain and Cohen (1983) developed their own five semantic 
formulas, which will be presented in this section. Their apology speech act set has 
served as a framework for various studies carried out by many researchers doing 
contrastive analysis of apologies in interlanguage pragmatics. 
Olshtain and Cohen (1983: 22) note that when the offender is positively inclined to 
apologize for the offence, in most cases only one of the formulas is sufficient to 
perform an apology. However, it often happens that two or more formulas are 
combined together in order to intensify the apology. The five semantic formulas of the 
apology speech act set developed by Olshtain and Cohen (1983: 22) are the 
following: 
1. An expression of an apology 
2. An explanation or account of the situation 
3. An acknowledgement of responsibility 
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4. An offer of repair 
5. A promise of forbearance 
The first formula in the set, an expression of an apology, consists of a number of 
subformulas: 
a. An expression of regret, e.g., “I’m sorry.” 
b. An offer of apology, e.g., “I apologize.” 
c. A request for forgiveness, e.g., “Excuse me.” “Please forgive me.” or “Pardon 
me.” 
Olshtain and Cohen (1983: 22) state that the first formula is used as a direct apology 
strategy, whereby the apologizer uses a word, an expression or a sentence 
containing a performative apology verb, such as apologize, be sorry, forgive, excuse, 
and pardon. They believe that the major semantic formulas are “non-language-
specific and [I] each language has a direct expression of apology using one or more 
of the “apology” verbs” (1983: 22). However, when it comes to the appropriateness of 
the formulas to certain situations, it may vary from language to language.  
The second formula is an explanation or account of the situation which “indirectly 
brought about the offence”, and it is used by the apologizer as an indirect speech act 
of apologizing (Olshtain & Cohen 1983: 22). If a person is late for a meeting, he/she 
might give an explanation such as  
(12) “The bus was late”  
and use that as an apology strategy or in combination with the first formula. However, 
Olshtain and Cohen note that in some countries this kind of excuse might be 
perfectly acceptable as an apology, while in some others it is less acceptable (ibid.: 
22). 
An acknowledgement of responsibility is the third formula, and it is employed by 
the offender “only when he/she recognizes responsibility for the offence” (Olshtain & 
Cohen 1983: 23). This formula consists of four subformulas, which are non-
language-specific, and they are: 
a. Accepting the blame, e.g., “It is my fault.” 
b. Expressing self-deficiency, e.g., “I was confused.” “I wasn’t thinking.” or “I 
didn’t see you.” 
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c. Recognizing the other person as deserving apology, e.g., “You are right!” 
d. Expressing lack of intent, e.g., “I didn’t mean to.” 
Only the first one among these four subformulas is a direct expression of 
responsibility, whereas the other three are indirect expressions. 
Both an offer of repair and a promise of forbearance are semantic formulas which are 
situation-specific. In order for the apologizer to use an offer of repair there has to be 
some kind of damage which resulted from his/her infringement, whereby the 
apologizer would, for example, say  
 (13) “I’ll pay for the broken vase.”  
      (Olshtain & Cohen 1983: 23).  
A promise of forbearance is the formula used by the offender in situations when 
he/she “could have avoided the offence but did not do so”, and therefore he/she 
promises not to repeat the offence (Olshtain & Cohen 1983: 23). The person might 
use the following utterance to perform the apology: 
 (14) “It won’t happen again.” 
The apology speech act set proposed by Olshtain and Cohen has been successfully 
applied to a large number of languages, which not only justifies their classification of 
the apology strategies, but also implies that their speech act set may be universal 
(Ogiermann 2009: 57). 
 
Trosborg (1987) proposes a speech act set built on Olshtain and Cohen (1983) and 
on the coding manual from the CCSARP (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 1984). Her apology 
speech act set contains the following seven apology strategies: 
1. Minimizing the degree of offence. With this strategy the apologizer does 
not deny responsibility, but only seeks to minimize the degree of infraction. 
There are three substrategies here: 
1.1 Minimizing: 
e.g. “Oh, what does that matter, that’s nothing”; “What about it, it’s 
not the end of the world”. 
1.2 Querying preconditions: 
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e.g. “Well, everybody does that” 
1.3 Blaming someone else: 
The offence committed by the complainee can be partly excuse by 
an offence committed by a third party. 
2. Acknowledgment of responsibility. When an apologizer employs this 
strategy he/she can choose to do it implicitly or explicitly. The sub-
categories are: 
2.1 Implicit acknowledgment: 
e.g. “I can see your point”; “Perhaps I shouldn’t have done it”. 
2.2 Explicit acknowledgement:  
e.g. “I’ll admit I forgot to do it”. 
2.3 Expression of lack of intent: 
e.g. “I didn’t mean to”. 
2.4 Expression of self-deficiency: 
e.g. “I was confused”; “You know I’m bad at...”. 
2.5 Expression of embarrassment: 
e.g. “I feel so bad about it”. 
2.6 Explicit acceptance of the blame: 
e.g. “It was entirely my fault”; “You’re right to blame me”. 
3. Explanation or account. The apologizer may try to mitigate his/her guilt by 
using this strategy. This can be done implicitly or explicitly: 
3.1 Implicit explanation: 
e.g. “Such things are bound to happen, you know”. 
3.2 Explicit explanation: 
e.g. “Sorry I’m late, but my car broke down”. 
4. Expression of apology. The apologizer uses this strategy when he/she 
wants to express his/her apology explicitly. 
4.1 Expression of regret: 
e.g. “I’m sorry”. 
4.2 Offer of apology: 
e.g. “I apologize”. 
4.3 Request for forgiveness: 
e.g. “Excuse me”; “Please, forgive me”; “Pardon me”. 
5. Offer of repair. The apologizer may offer to repair the damage, or offer a 
kind of ‘compensatory’ action to the complainer. 
 5.1 Repair: 
e.g. “I’ll pay for the cleaning”. 
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 5.2 Compensation: 
e.g. “You can borrow my dress instead”. 
6. Promise of forbearance. The apologizer may promise not to repeat the 
infraction again. 
(15)  “It won’t happen again, I promise”. 
7. Expressing concern for hearer. The apologizer may express concern for 
the well-being of the complainee. 
         (Trosborg 1987: 150-152) 
 
In connection to the above classification of apology strategies, Borkin and Reinhart’s 
(1979) discussion contrasting the expressions I’m sorry and Excuse me can be taken 
into consideration for the purpose of better explaining their use in apology situations. 
The researchers argue that although both expressions are used as formulaic 
remedies, there are slight differences as regards the appropriateness of their use in 
certain situations. According to Borkin and Reinhart (1979: 59), “the simple form 
Excuse me may be used more appropriately than the simple form I’m sorry before an 
infraction”. The situation they offer as an example is when someone is hurriedly 
trying to make his way through a crowd of people, in which case “excuse me is more 
appropriate than I’m sorry in getting someone to step aside” (1979: 59). But if a 
person wants to apologize after getting in someone else’s way, both expressions are 
equally appropriate. Borkin and Reinhart define Excuse me as “a formula to remedy 
a past or immediately forthcoming breach of etiquette or other light infraction of a 
social rule on the part of the speaker”, and I’m sorry as “an expression of dismay or 
regret at an unpleasantness suffered by the speaker and/or the addressee” (1979: 
61). They also point out to the fact that while Excuse me is limited to being used as a 
remedy tool, I’m sorry is not necessarily used as a remedy, but may function as an 
expression of sympathy without any implication of responsibility.  
 
7.4.3 Apology modifiers – intensifiers and downgraders 
 
In addition to the main strategies in the apology speech act set, there are ways in 
which the apologizer can modify the apology by either intensifying it or by 
downgrading it. An intensification makes the apology stronger “crating even more 
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support for H and more humiliation for S” (Olshtain & Cohen 1990: 47). Internal 
modification usually occurs by adding a conventional modifier, such as very, really, 
so, terribly, truly, awfully, deeply. External modification can occur in a form of a 
comment expressing stronger interest and concern for the hearer  
 (16) “Oh, no!” or “Oh, God.” 
Downgraders are modifiers which lessen the strength of the apology, and at the 
same time minimize the degree of offence. They can take the form of a comment, 
such as  
 (17) “Sorry, but we never start on time anyhow” or  
 (18) “Sorry, but you shouldn’t be so sensitive”  
       (Blum-Kulka et al. 1989: 21). 
Another instance of the use of a downgrader is when the speaker pretends not to 
notice the offence: 
 (19) “Am I late?” 
As opposed to Olshtain and Cohen, who refer to downgraders as modifications of 
apology strategies, Trosborg (1994: 379) makes such classification that puts some 
downgraders into “evasive strategies” which form the first category of apology 
strategies. However, she does note that this kind of strategies “can hardly count as 
apologies”, and she also considers internal modifiers apart form apology strategies 
classification (1994: 386). According to Trosborg’s categorization of internal 
modifiers, the following eight categories of downgraders and upgraders are 
distinguished:  
1. Downtoners – adverbial sentence modifiers, such as: just, simply, etc. (e.g. 
I just left for five minutes) 
2. Understaters – phrases that under-represent the state of affairs denoted in 
the offence, such as: a little bit, a second, etc. (e.g. I went out for a second 
only) 
3. Hedges – adverbials by means of which the offender avoids a precise 
propositional specification, such as: kind of, somehow, etc. (e.g. Somehow, 
it all happened very quickly, I kind of didn’t notice before it was too late). 
4. Subjectivizers – modifiers that characterize the proposition as the 
speaker’s personal opinion, or indicate his/her attitude towards the 
proposition, such as: I think, I suppose, I’m afraid, etc. 
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5. Intensifiers – adverbials intensifying part of the proposition, e.g. intensifying 
a lack of intention, an expression of regret. (e.g. I’m terribly sorry) 
6. Commitment upgraders – sentence modifiers expressing a special 
commitment towards the proposition. (e.g. I was sure/positive that you 
wouldn’t mindI) 
7. Cajolers – gambits functioning at the interpersonal level of discourse with 
the function of restoring harmony between interlocutors, such as: you 
know, you see, I mean, etc. 
8. Appealers – discourse elements (including tags) intended to elicit a 
response from the complainer, appealing to his/her understanding, such 
as: okay, right, don’t you think?  
       (Trosborg 1994: 385-386) 
Trosborg (1994: 383) also writes about the apologizer’s attempt at softening the 
complainer’s feelings with the use of a strategic disarmer, for example: 
 (20) “This is most embarrassing for me, I really never meant to...”  
She explains that the function of strategic disarmers is to “pave the way for the 
acceptance of the apology”. However, she points out that strategic disarmers, as part 
of the act of apologizing, differ from apologies “which function as disarmers 
preceding other speech acts” such as requests, complaints, refusals, e.g. 
(21) “I’m terribly sorry but you seem to have taken my suitcase by mistake” 
(before a complaint) 
(22) I’m sorry, but I’m afraid there are no more seats left for the late show 
(before a refusal)  
        (Trosborg 1994: 384). 
 
7.5 Apologies across cultures 
 
Although the above explained apology strategies are available across languages and 
cultures, the differences in their use have been empirically researched in 
interlanguage pragmatic studies. Some of the best known studies include Cohen and 
Olshtain (1981), Fraser (1981), Olshtain and Cohen (1983), Blum-Kulka et al. (1989), 
Olshtain (1989), Trosborg (1995), Márquez Reiter (2000). 
Edmondson (1981) was one of the first researchers to carry out apology studies, 
whereby he considered apologies in the context of conversational routines. Fraser 
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(1981) analysed apologies taking into account the nature of the infraction, the 
severity of the infraction, the situation in which it occurred, as well as the familiarity 
between the interactants. The research conducted by Cohen and Olshtain (1981, 
1983) and Olshtain and Blum-Kulka (1985) helped to establish the apology speech 
act set which has since been used by many other researchers in their cross-cultural 
investigation of apologies. Cohen and Olshtain (1981) dealt with measuring 
sociocultural competence, i.e. “the ability to use target language knowledge in 
communicative situations”, focusing on the speech act of apology. Based on Fraser’s 
(1981) nine different apology strategies, Olshtain and Cohen (1983) developed their 
own apology speech act set in order to classify apologies. The aim of most cross-
cultural studies dealing with apologies has been to investigate linguistic differences 
and similarities in the realization of the speech act across different languages. 
Studies are usually conducted by comparing the performance of native and non-
native speakers of English. Some of the existing contrastive analyses include English 
and German apologies (House 1989, Olshtain 1989), Austrian German (Meier 1992, 
1996), English and Danish (Trosborg 1987, Kasper 1989), English and Hebrew 
(Cohen & Olshtain 1981, Olshtain 1989), English and Spanish (Garcia 1989, Cordella 
1990, Marquez Reiter 2000), English and Polish and Hungarian (Suszczynska 
1999).1 
The Cross-Cultural Speech Act Realisation Project (CCSARP) has been the largest 
speech act study so far, and it was conducted by a number of international linguists 
(Blum-Kulka, House & Kasper 1989; Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 1984). The study 
investigated realizations of requests and apologies in five languages: German, 
Danish, Canadian French, Hebrew and English (American, Australian and British). 
The framework developed in this project has been used in various cross-cultural and 
interlanguage studies comparing two or more languages. 
                                                 
1 Trosborg (1987) and House (1989) investigate British English. The rest refer to American English. 
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8 Empirical study 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In recent years there has been a considerable amount of research devoted to 
examining differences between L2 learners and native speakers in the performance 
of apology strategies. The findings of those studies show that the use of apologies 
differs between L2 learners and native speakers in several ways. Cohen and 
Olshtain (1981) and Olshtain and Cohen (1983) found differences in the distribution 
of the intensity of apology, Trosborg (1987) and Kondo (1997) found significant 
differences in the number of explanation strategies used, and Linell (1992) found that 
L2 learners employed a lower number of acknowledgement strategy than native 
English speakers. Given the fact that a learner’s first and second languages may 
differ in the realization of speech acts, the inappropriate use of a semantic formula in 
L2 due to pragmatic transfer from L1 is not a rare phenomenon. In order to avoid 
undesirable instances of miscommunication, it is important for a learner to acquire 
linguistic, social and pragmatic competence in the target language. 
This study presents empirical research aimed at analysing the realization of apology 
strategies by Serbian learners of English. It investigates to what extent language 
learners transfer socio-cultural rules from L1 to L2, and how they conform to and 
diverge from native speaker norms in the performance of apologies. In the analysis of 
the data the influence of cultural, social and situational factors on the choice of the 
strategies will be considered. 
 
8.2 Methodological considerations 
 
Research conducted in the field of cross-cultural and interlanguage pragmatics has 
employed various methods of data collection. However, there is a significant dilemma 
in pragmatic research which concerns these methods, the validity of data collected 
and “their adequacy to approximate the authentic performance of linguistic action” 
(Kasper & Dahl 1991: 215). 
Discourse completion tests (DCTs) are written questionnaires which have been a 
widely used data elicitation tool in interlanguage pragmatics. Although they have 
 66 
been criticized for limiting the capturing of authentic communication, the number of 
their advantages is significantly bigger than of any other data collection instrument. 
An important characteristic is that DCTs allow the collection of large corpus of data in 
a short period of time, which has led to a widespread use of DCTs in pragmatic 
research. There are three types of questionnaire used in the field of pragmatics, and 
these are: production, multiple-choice, and rating-scale questionnaires. The 
difference between them lies in the type of response that they elicit. Whereas 
multiple-choice and rating scale questionnaires offer fixed responses from which 
respondents have to choose the most appropriate one, production questionnaires are 
open-ended. This means that respondents are required to provide a response with 
regard to the given situational descriptions. Some of the studies that have employed 
this instrument are Olshtain and Cohen (1983), House and Kasper (1987), the 
CCSARP (Blum-Kulka, et al. 1989), Kasper (1989), Faerch and Kasper (1989), 
Beebe et al. (1990), etc. 
Numerous speech act studies have used role play as a data collection technique. 
The potential of role plays is that they allow the sequential organization of language 
production. On the other hand, role plays need transcribing, which presents one of 
their disadvantages as it is very time consuming. Studies that have conducted 
research employing this instrument are Scarcella (1979), Kasper (1981), Trosborg 
(1987), Tanaka (1988), etc. 
An important feature of DCTs, as wells as of role plays, is that they allow for a 
comparative study of native and non-native speaker behaviour in a given context. For 
that reason the present study will be based on data elicited by a DCT. 
 
8.3 Research design 
 
8.3.1 Subjects  
 
The discourse completion test was constructed in English and Serbian, and was 
completed by a total of 60 respondents. In order to set up norms for acceptable 
apologies, the participants were divided into three groups. They included 20 native 
speakers of American English, 20 native speakers of Serbian, and 20 Serbian 
learners of English. They constituted a broadly homogenous group in terms of age, 
social class and education. The respondents were mainly university students and 
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graduates in the United States or Serbia, and they were aged from 19 to 34. Non-
native English speakers have studied English for 8 to 12 years, and they were asked 
to rate their speaking ability. Eleven rated themselves as excellent speakers of 
English, eight as good, and one as fair. The majority of them have never spent time 
in an English-speaking community. 
 
8.3.2 Design of the questionnaire 
 
The DCT used in this study was designed so as to elicit apologies in a series of 
situations. It consists of ten open-ended scenarios, eight of which depict offensive 
situations, while two serve as distractors. The DCT requires the respondents to 
provide spontaneous responses which resemble real life situations.  
The scenarios selected for this study were designed by Ogiermann (2009) and used 
in the research published in her book On apologising in negative and positive 
politeness cultures. The DCT was constructed so to include the combination of 
contextual variables in order to be able to test the influence of social power and 
social distance on the speaker’s strategy choice. Hence, the situations were based 
on equal and unequal power combined with three levels of social distance: low 
(between friends), medium (between acquaintances) and high (between strangers).  
The following eight situations were used in this study: 
1. H had asked S to look after his fish and some of them have died. 
2. S had borrowed H’s book and misplaced it. 
3. S lets go a heavy door and it hits H. 
4. H had asked S to return her DVSs and S forgot. 
5. S mistakes H for his friend and hits him on the back. 
6. S goes by train without a ticket and is caught by H. 
7. S had a loud party and left a dirty staircase behind in H’s house. 
8. S walks out of the shop with an unpaid CD and is stopped by H. 
      (adapted from Ogiermann 2009: 84) 
 
Two additional situations were included in the DCT to serve as distractors: one of 
them eliciting a complaint and the other one a request. This way, it was hoped, the 
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respondents would not reply mechanically providing a response set, which could 
easily be done when replying to eight consecutive offence situations.  
The combinations of contextual variables used in the eight scenarios are presented 
in the following table: 
 
 
      Scenario             Power   Distance 
 
1. Dead fish   S=H   Low 
2. Professor’s book  S<H   Medium 
3. Heavy door   S=H   High 
4. DVDs    S=H   Low 
5. Mistaking a stranger S=H   High 
6. Ticket inspector  S<H   High 
7. Landlady   S<H   Medium 
8. Security guard  S<H   High 
 
      Table 1 Contextual variables included in the eight situations 
 
In the introduction to the DCT the respondents were instructed to imagine 
themselves in the ten presented situations. They were asked to react as 
spontaneously as possible while responding in direct speech. The respondents were 
not requested to apologize since it was considered that the authenticity of the data 
could be affected if the respondents were informed about the focus of the study. The 
demographic information included in the questionnaire covered the respondents’ age 
for all three groups, whereas the group of non-native English speakers were also 
asked to rate their speaking ability choosing between excellent, good, fair and poor 
(see Appendix for a sample of the questionnaire). 
The questionnaire was taken over in English, slightly modified, and then translated 
into Serbian. The group of Serbian native speakers received Serbian version of the 
questionnaire, whereas native English speakers and Serbian learners of English 
received the questionnaire in English. The questionnaire was distributed as an online 
version. 
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8.4 Apology strategies 
 
The taxonomy used in the present study was based on the existing taxonomies 
proposed by Olshtain and Cohen (1983), Trosborg (1987), and Ogiermann (2009).  
The following eight apology strategies were employed in the analysis of the data: 
1. Expression of apology 
2. Acknowledgement of responsibility 
3. Admission of facts 
4. Justification  
5. Excuse  
6. Offer of repair 
7. Expressing concern for hearer 
8. Promise of forbearance 
1. Expression of apology is a strategy which appears in Olshtain and Cohen’s 
speech act set (1983), as well as in Trosborg (1987). In the CCSARP it was labelled 
as Illocutionary Force Indicating Device (IFID), the term first introduced by Searle 
(1969). The strategy encompasses several semantic formulas, which belong to the 
group of direct apology strategies:  
 
ENGLISH    SERBIAN 
Expression of regret:  I’m sorry.   Žao mi je. 
Offer of apology:   I apologize.   Izvinjavam se./Izvini-te. 
Request for forgiveness:  Excuse me.    Izvini-te. 
Forgive me.   Oprosti-te. 
Pardon me.   Pardon. 
  
Table 2 Expression of apology categories and their realizations  
                        in English and Serbian 
 
2. Acknowledgement of responsibility is a strategy used by Olshtain and Cohen 
(1983) and by Trosborg (1987). The subformulas distinguished in the present study 
are presented in Table 3 together with examples in English and Serbian. 
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     ENGLISH    SERBIAN 
 
Accepting the blame:  It’s my fault.   Pogrešio sam. 
Expressing lack of intent:  I didn’t mean to.  Nisam namerno. 
Expressing self-deficiency: I’m so stupid.  Baš sam glup. 
Expression of embarrassment: This is embarrassing. Jako mi je neprijatno. 
 
           Table 3 Acknowledgement of responsibility subformulas 
 
 
3. Admission of facts is a strategy taken over from Ogiermann (2009). This 
category could be placed in a middle position on the responsibility scale, and 
Ogiermann (2009: 142) argues that by stating facts “the speaker distances him- or 
herself from the offence in the attempt to save face”. This type of strategy often 
occurs in situations where the speaker needs to inform the hearer about the offence, 
and it is most often combined with some other apology strategy. Here is an example 
from the questionnaire in English (E) and Serbian (S): 
 (23) Your fish died. (E) 
Neke ribice su uginule. (S) 
 
 
4. Justification is a strategy by which the speaker admits some responsibility but 
he/she provides arguments trying to justify the offensive behaviour.  
(24) I was really busy. (E) 
Imao sam obaveze. (S) 
 
5. Excuse occurs when the speaker does not deny responsibility but names external 
factors as responsible for the offence. This way the speaker tries to free him/herself 
from responsibility for the infraction. 
 (25) I was distracted. (E) 
 (26) Bila sam na službenom putu. (S) 
   (I was on a business trip.) 
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6. Offer of repair is a strategy used by Olshtain and Cohen (1983) and by Trosborg 
(1987). It is employed when the apologizer is willing to repair the damage which 
resulted from the infringement: 
 (27) I’ll pay for the damage. (E) 
Platiću štetu. (S) 
 
7. Expressing concern for hearer is a category proposed by Trosborg (1987), and 
it relates to the consequences of the apologizer’s infraction. By expressing his/her 
concern for the hearer, the apologizer acknowledges his/her responsibility: 
 (28) I hope you are ok. (E) 
Nadam se da ste dobro. (S) 
 
8. Promise of forbearance is a strategy which the speaker uses after the offence to 
express his/her promise that the offence will not be repeated. 
 (29) It won’t happen again. (E) 
Neće se ponoviti. (S) 
Apart from these eight apology strategies, the category of opting out will be 
considered as the speaker’s choice to avoid responsibility in offensive situations. The 
category will include denial of responsibility and blaming the hearer for the offence: 
 (30) It wasn’t me. (E) 
 (31) Ne znam ništa o tome. (S) 
  (I know nothing about it.) 
 
Apology modifiers used in the responses will also be analysed in this study. They will 
be classified according to the propositions made by Olshtain and Cohen (1983) and 
Trosborg (1994) (see section 7.4.3).  
 
8.5 Apology data analysis by situation 
 
This chapter analyses apology strategies employed by the respondents across 
situations and language groups. Each of the situations will be considered separately. 
The analysis will include examples from all three language groups. All the responses 
 72 
in the questionnaires were assigned identification codes specifying the language 
group (E standing for native English; S standing for Serbian; SLE standing for 
Serbian learner of English), the number of situation and questionnaire, for example: 
(SLE-5/11) = Serbian learner of English, situation 5, questionnaire 11. Serbian 
examples will be translated into English, and the translation will be kept as close to 
the original as possible.  
 
8.5.1 Situation 1 (dead fish) 
 
The figures in Table 4 illustrate the distribution of all apology strategies across 
language groups in situation 1 (dead fish). It shows that direct expressions of apology 
are the most frequent form employed by all three groups of speakers.  
 
Table 4 Distribution of strategies across language groups in situation 1 
SITUATION 1            NE          NS        SLE 
 
Apology   20  18  22 
Acknowledge  7  6  16 
Admit facts   3  4  3 
Justification    14  10  12 
Excuse    1  2  4 
Repair   10  11  13 
Concern   –  –  – 
Forbearance   –  –  – 
Total no. of strategies 55  51  70 
Opt out   2  4  1 
NE = native English;   NS = native Serbian;   SLE = Serbian learners of English 
  
Table 5 illustrates the occurrences of all direct apology strategies in situation 1. As 
can be seen, 100% of all direct apology strategies performed by native English 
speakers are made up of the expression of regret. Similarly, 91% of direct apology 
strategies used by Serbian learners of English forms the direct strategy (I’m) sorry. 
However, of all direct apology realizations in Serbian, offer of apology exhibits the 
highest frequency, which is 72%, whereas the expression of regret makes up 22%.  
At this point it has to be mentioned that the extent to which the expression of regret 
functions as an apology varies across languages and cultures. Ogiermann (2009: 
107) argues that although I’m sorry is the most frequent apology strategy in English, 
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“it does not entail responsibility acceptance as it does not link the object of regret with 
the speaker”. Moreover, it can be used as an expression of sympathy, or even denial 
of responsibility. However, this strategy is largely accepted as an expression of 
apology in English, and this data exhibit its almost exclusive use by native English 
speakers. Serbian learners of English also show a strong preference for the same 
form of the strategy. However, in Serbian, the most favoured form is an offer of 
apology, while the expression of regret is much less frequent. 
 
Table 5 Frequencies of direct apology strategies in situation 1 
DIRECT APOLOGY STRATEGIES           NE          NS        SLE 
Expression of regret   20  4  20 
Offer of apology    –  13  2 
Request for forgiveness   –  1  – 
 
 
The second most frequently used strategy among the Americans in situation 1 is 
justification with 14 occurrences, but it was also popular with the other two groups of 
respondents. The main argument was the lack of time, which was also suggested in 
the description of the situation. 
(32) ... My schedule was crazy and I didn't have the time to come feed your 
fish. ... (E-1/1) 
(33) ... stvarno nisam imala vremena da dolazim stalno. ... (S-1/6) 
(... I really didn’t have time to come that often. ...) 
(34) ... I forgot to give food to the fish only once. I'm sorry. (SLE-1/3) 
Responses made by Serbian learners of English include the highest number of 
accounts acknowledging responsibility. It occurred 16 times, whereas in native 
English and Serbian responses it appeared only 7 and 6 times respectively. While 
the Americans mainly expressed their lack of intent, Serbian learners of English 
referred to their irresponsibility and neglect: 
(35) I’m really sorry, but... I think I might have accidentally killed your fish.      
(E-1/10) 
 (36) Očigledno sam uprskao stvar, oprosti mi! (S-1/4) 
(I obviously messed up, forgive me!) 
 (37) ... I know I was irresponsible, I am so sorry. (SLE-1/18) 
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The frequency of excuses was extremely low in native English and Serbian 
responses, and they usually pointed to external factors as responsible for the 
damage (38). Non-native English responses contained a lot of excuses usually taking 
the form of suggestions why the fish are themselves responsible for what happened 
to them (39), (40). 
(38) I’m really sorry but I was held at work and I wasn’t able to feed the fish on 
time. ... (E-1/11) 
(39) ... Maybe some of them were already sick. ... (SLE-1/12) 
(40) Well...maybe they died of old age. (SLE-1/20) 
An offer of repair is a strategy with a relatively high percentage of occurrences in all 
three groups’ responses. However, while native speaker groups usually offered to 
buy new fish, non-native English speakers admitted they had bought new fish and 
replaced the dead ones (41). This strategy was mostly combined with the expression 
of apology, but there are instances where a respondent actually denied responsibility 
but still offered to repair the damage (42). 
(41) ... some of your fish are dead because of my neglect. In the meantime I 
filled in the tank with new fish. ... (SLE-1/10) 
(42) ... some of your fish, namely Fifi and Princess Tangerine, died of natural 
causes, but don’t worry! I replaced them. (E-1/17) 
Opting out was a category which appeared 4 times in Serbian responses, whereas 
the Americans provided 2 instances, and Serbian speakers of English only one 
instance. 
(43) Pojma nemam, hranila sam ih skoro svaki dan, ne znam kako su mogle 
da uginu. (S-1/2) 
 (I have no idea, I fed them almost every day, I don’t know how they could 
die.) 
 (44) I have no idea, I swear they were alive last time I was here. (SLE-1/8) 
The admission of facts was used by all three groups with similar frequencies. The 
strategy was often employed in combination with the denial of responsibility on the 
part of the native speakers. Examples (45) and (46) contain the expression of regret, 
but its function here is to distance the speaker from the damage. In non-native 
responses the admission of facts was combined with the acceptance of responsibility 
in all 3 occurrences (47). 
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(45) I’m sorry to report that when I went to feed the fish on Tuesday, the yellow 
one seemed to have died. I'm sorry for your loss. (E-1/14) 
(46) ... mnogo mi je žao, neke ribice su uginule, ne znam zašto. (S-1/1) 
 (... I’m very sorry, some fish died, I don’t know why.) 
(47) I am terribly sorry but it seems that some of the fish have died. I might 
have forgotten to come for a few days, I just haven’t had time. I am so 
sorry. (SLE-1/5) 
 
Although speakers in all three groups used very similar strategies in their accounts, 
some interesting observations could be made. When producing justifications, the 
group responding in Serbian adhered closely to the information provided in the 
description of the situation. They seem to regard lack of time as a good justification 
form, whereas native English and non-native English speakers employed other forms 
such as forgetting or incompetence. It appears that the informants responding in 
Serbian were more interested in producing face-saving accounts than the informants 
in the other two groups. 
 
8.5.2 Situation 2 (professor’s book) 
 
In situation 2 (professor’s book), which is based on medium social distance and high 
social power, the total number of strategies employed by native English speakers is 
noticeably higher than the number of strategies used by Serbian learners of English.  
 
Table 6 Distribution of strategies across language groups in situation 2 
SITUATION 2           ENGLISH         SERBIAN       SL ENGLISH 
 
Apology   13  12  9 
Acknowledge  –  3  1 
Admit facts   15  9  11 
Justification    2  8  6 
Excuse    –  –  2 
Repair   15  7  6 
Concern   –  –  – 
Forbearance   –  –  – 
Total no. of strategies 45  39  35 
Opt out   –  –  1 
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As presented by the figures in Table 6, direct apology strategies were almost equally 
used in native English and native Serbian responses. Table 7 shows that the 
expression of regret was again dominant in the responses made by native English 
speakers, while the responses made in Serbian mostly contained an offer of apology. 
Unlike in situation 1 (dead fish), where Serbian learners of English employed the 
equal number of the expression of regret as native English speakers, in situation 2 
they used it less frequently. Instead, they used more offers of apology.  
 
Table 7 Frequencies of direct apology strategies in situation 2 
DIRECT APOLOGY STRATEGIES           NE          NS        SLE 
Expression of regret   12  –  4 
Offer of apology    1  10  5 
Request for forgiveness   –  2  – 
 
 
An interesting observation could be made as regards justification strategy. It was 
used only 2 times by native English speakers, as opposed to 8 occurrences in 
responses made in Serbian. Serbian learners of English used the strategy 6 times, 
and the nature of those responses resembled a lot the ones made in Serbian. 
Justifications contained two types of arguments, the first of which referred to the 
speakers’ claim that they still needed the book (48), (49), (50). This kind of a 
response was usually accompanied by a request on the part of the speaker asking 
permission to keep the book longer (48), (49). 
(48) ... I would like to keep it for a few more days so I will have the time to re-
read some chapters and make some photocopies. That is the reason why 
I didn't brought it now. ... May I keep it for a few more days? (SLE-2/3) 
(49) I'm so sorry, but if you could be so kind to let me keep your book for the 
next few days because I have found some great insights on my topic in it? 
(SLE-2/12) 
(50) ... Moram neke stvari još da kopiram. I (S-2/8) 
 (I I must copy some things. ...) 
The other form of justification included the argument that the speaker had forgotten 
the book at home (51), (52). Even though this way the speakers wanted to lessen the 
degree of offence and save their face, this argument, just as the previous one, is a 
lie. As the description of the situation states, the speaker has looked for the book and 
has not found it. 
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(51) Sorry, can I get it back to you another time? I forgot to bring it with me.  
(E-2/2) 
 (52) Izvinite što nisam donela knjigu, zaboravila sam je. ... (S-2/15) 
 (I apologize for not having brought the book, I forgot it. ...) 
The most face-threatening strategy used in situation 2 is the admission of facts, i.e. 
the speaker’s confession that the book may be lost. The group that showed most 
preference for this type of strategy was the American. Of all strategies they used, the 
admission of facts made up 33,3%, as opposed to 23% of responses in Serbian, and 
31,4% of responses made by Serbian learners of English.  
(53) I think I’ve misplaced it somewhere, I’m really sorry. I’ll have another look 
for it today. ... (E-2/16) 
(54) I really have to apologize, but I cannot find the book that you have lent 
me. ... (SLE-2/13) 
As examples (53) and (54) illustrate, this strategy was often used in combination with 
a direct apology strategy. However, there were instances when it was combined only 
with an offer of repair (55). This strategy was also very frequent in American 
responses, appearing 15 times, whereas in accounts made in Serbian it occurred 
only 7 times. Non-native English responses contained 6 instances of an offer of 
repair. But according to the responses, all speakers showed significant optimism as 
regards finding and returning the book (56). This fact displays a strong tendency for 
face-saving and maintaining harmony with the person of higher social power. 
 (55) I cannot find the book. May I replace it with another copy? (SLE-2/16) 
 (56) It’s somewhere in my house, I’ll have it by tomorrow! Sorry. (E-2/20) 
 
Denials of responsibility were not found in the data, which only suggests that the 
speakers are aware of the face-threat underlying the offence and its possible 
consequences. When they chose to conceal the true nature of the offence, they 
attempted to minimize the severity of the offence by providing face-saving strategies 
reflected in their invented arguments. 
 
8.5.3 Situation 3 (heavy door) 
 
In situation 3 (heavy door) the total number of strategies used differs significantly 
between the American group and the two groups of Serbian speakers. The 
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Americans provided only 39 apology strategies, whereas the group responding in 
Serbian used 54 strategies, 5 fewer than the group of non-native speakers of 
English. Next to direct apology strategies, justification and concern were the two 
most frequently used strategies. 
 
Table 8 Distribution of strategies across language groups in situation 3 
SITUATION 3           ENGLISH         SERBIAN       SL ENGLISH 
 
Apology   22  22  23 
Acknowledge  1  7  6 
Admit facts   –  –  – 
Justification    4  8  10 
Excuse    –  1  1 
Repair   –  2  6 
Concern   12  14  12 
Forbearance   –  –  – 
Total no. of strategies 39  54  58 
Opt out   –  –  – 
 
 
Table 9 illustrates frequencies of direct apology strategies in situation 3. It shows that 
the expression of regret was again the most preferred strategy among native and 
non-native English speakers. The informants responding in Serbian employed 18 
offers of apology and 3 requests for forgiveness, (57), which were not present in 
native English responses. Non-native English responses contained only one 
occurrence of this strategy. Combinations of direct apology strategies were frequent 
in responses made by both groups of Serbian speakers, as illustrated in example 
(58).  
 (57) ... oprostite, molim Vas, oprostite! Jeste li povređeni? (S-3/8) 
 (... forgive me, please, forgive me. Are you hurt?) 
(58) ... sorry miss I really didn’t notice you were walking behind. Please accept 
my apology. (SLE-3/10) 
 
 
 
Table 9 Frequencies of direct apology strategies in situation 3 
DIRECT APOLOGY STRATEGIES           NE          NS        SLE 
Expression of regret   22  1  20 
Offer of apology    –  18  2 
Request for forgiveness   –  3  1 
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The expression of concern was the second most frequently employed indirect 
strategy, and it was almost equally used by all three groups of speakers: 
 (59) Sorry. Are you okay? (E-3/6) 
(60) I am so sorry madam. Are you ok? Let me take your bags to the station, 
please. (SLE-3/18) 
As regards justifications, they were used in Serbian responses twice as often as in 
native English responses. Serbian learners of English produced a similar number of 
justifications to the other Serbian group. 
 (61) ... Stvarno mi je žao, nisam vas primetio. ... (S-3/19) 
 (I’m really sorry, I didn’t notice you. ...) 
While most justifications offered by Serbian speakers referred to not having noticed 
the offended, the American informants offered another type of argument: 
 (62) I’m so sorry! It slipped out of my hands! (E-3/5) 
Both groups of Serbian speakers provided a relatively high number of strategies 
expressing the lack of intent, as opposed to only one instance found in the American 
data: 
 (63) Zaista nije bilo namerno! ... (S-3/7) 
 (It really wasn’t on purpose! ...) 
 (64) How stupid of me! I’m so very sorry ... (SLE-3/8) 
Another interesting difference which could be found in the data is the frequency of 
the repair strategy, which was absent from native English responses but was 
employed by the other two groups of speakers.  
 (65) ... Dajte da vam pomognem oko namirnica. (S-3/16) 
 (... Let me help you with the groceries.) 
(66) ... here...let me help you...is there anything I can do for you?         (SLE-
3/19) 
It can be noticed from the data in situation 3 that the responses offered by the group 
of American informants were rather brief. The other two groups of speakers provided 
responses using a lot larger number of strategies, which shows that they are more 
ready to communicate with strangers. 
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8.5.4 Situation 4 (DVDs) 
 
Situation 4 (DVDs) is based on low social distance and equal social power, and it 
presents a scenario in which the offender causes damage by failing to keep a 
promise. As in situation 1 (dead fish), the hearer is not present when the damage 
takes place, so this may be the reason for the speaker to produce a higher number of 
apology strategies, trying to explain the events preceding the offence. 
 
Table 10 Distribution of strategies across language groups in situation 4 
SITUATION 4           ENGLISH         SERBIAN       SL ENGLISH 
 
Apology   18  14  10 
Acknowledge  6  6  4 
Admit facts   –  –  – 
Justification    10  16  15 
Excuse    –  –  – 
Repair   18  18  19 
Concern   –  –  – 
Forbearance   1  –  2 
Total no. of strategies 53  54  50 
Opt out   –  1  1 
 
 
 
The three groups of informants employed similar number of apology strategies. Table 
11 illustrates the frequencies of direct apology categories produced by the speakers, 
with the highest number of them found in the American data. The Americans 
employed 18 expressions of regret, as opposed to only 10 produced by Serbian 
learners of English. In native Serbian responses 12 offers of apology and 2 
expressions of regret occurred.  
 
 
Table 11 Frequencies of direct apology strategies in situation 4 
DIRECT APOLOGY STRATEGIES           NE          NS        SLE 
Expression of regret   18  2  10 
Offer of apology    –  12  – 
Request for forgiveness   –  –  – 
 
 
Direct apology strategies were usually combined with justifications and offers of 
repair, which present the two most frequently used strategies in native Serbian and 
 81 
non-native English responses. The argument which was generally offered to explain 
the offence was “forgetting”, and it dominated in all three groups’ responses. It should 
be noted that this argument was given in the description of the situation.  
 (67) Sorry about that. I totally forgot ... (E-4/11) 
 (68) ... potpuno mi je to otišlo sa pameti! ... (S-4/17) 
 (...it completely slipped my mind!...) 
While the Americans used exclusively “forgetting” as their justification, the two 
Serbian groups used it together with an additional justification in several instances: 
(69) Totalno sam zaboravio. Svakakve obaveze sam imao tog dana. ...         
(S-4/16) 
 (I totally forgot. I had all kinds of things to do that day. ... ) 
 (70) I’m sorry, I totally forgot, I was very busy ... (SLE-4/20) 
Acknowledgement of responsibility occurred in equal number in native English and 
Serbian responses, while in non-native English data it appeared fewer times. In most 
instances it consisted of the admission of guilt, and it was usually used in 
combination with offers of repair, (71), (72): 
 (71) Argh! My fault. I'll pay the fine. (E-4/12) 
 (72) Oh no, I feel so guilty, I will pay the fees ... (SLE-4/14) 
Serbian speakers expressed self-criticism in their responses, but this strategy was 
also used as justification in an attempt to place at least half of the blame on the 
hearer. Two such examples were found in responses offered by both groups of 
Serbian informants: 
(73) Znala si da u mene ne možeš da imaš previše poverenja kada su te stvari 
u pitanju, tako da mislim da smo obe krive. ... (S-4/20) 
 (You knew you couldn’t have too much trust in me when it came to this 
kind of favours, so I think that we are both guilty. ...) 
(74) Well, you know that I keep forgetting things, you shouldn't have let me do 
that instead of you in the first place! (SLE-4/19) 
On the whole, there is a high degree of agreement as regards the types of apology 
strategies used in situation 4. Some differences could be found in the frequency of 
their employment, which shows similarities between the two groups of Serbian 
informants. 
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8.5.5 Situation 5 (mistaking a stranger) 
 
Situation 5 (mistaking a stranger) is based on high social distance and equal social 
power. The offence could be considered a light one, and not necessarily requiring 
long encounters. The present data illustrates a rather high frequency of direct 
apology strategies and also the restricted choice of indirect apology strategies. Table 
12 shows that the total number of strategies used by the two groups of Serbian 
speakers is equal, whereas native English speakers provided fewer strategies. 
 
 
Table 12 Distribution of strategies across language groups in situation 5 
SITUATION 5           ENGLISH         SERBIAN       SL ENGLISH 
 
Apology   22  24  25 
Acknowledge  4  3  3 
Admit facts   –  –  – 
Justification    17  16  16 
Excuse    –  7  7 
Repair   1  –  – 
Concern   1  2  1 
Forbearance   –  –  – 
Total no. of strategies 45  52  52 
Opt out   –  –  – 
 
 
Table 13 reveals the distribution of direct apology categories in situation 5, which 
does not differ much from their distribution in the previous four situations. Native 
English and non-native English responses show the equal number of expressions of 
regret, while the informants responding in Serbian employed the similar number of 
offers of apology. A slightly more formal category, request for forgiveness, appeared 
only once in the American data, whereas in each of the Serbian groups it appeared 
twice. The form used in native English is ‘excuse me’, in Serbian it was ‘oprostite’ 
(‘forgive me’), and in non-native English the forms were ‘excuse me’ and ‘pardon me’. 
 
Table 13 Frequencies of direct apology strategies in situation 5 
DIRECT APOLOGY STRATEGIES           NE          NS        SLE 
Expression of regret   21  –  21 
Offer of apology    –  22  2 
Request for forgiveness   1  2  2 
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Justifications are the second most frequently used apology strategy in situation 5. 
The speakers largely adhered to the information provided in the description of the 
situation, as can be seen in the following examples: 
 (75) I’m sorry! I thought you were someone else! (E-5/15) 
 (76) ... izvini...! Mislio sam da si moj drug. (S-5/9) 
 (... I apologize...! I thought you were my friend.) 
 (77) I’m sorry, I thought it was someone else! Sorry again! (SLE-5/17) 
In the American data, there were also instances of elliptic expressions serving the 
function of justifications, such as: 
 (78) Wrong guy, sorry. (E-5/11) 
Responses offered by native Serbian speakers and Serbian learners of English did 
not contain such instances. 
Excuses have been defined as strategies which differ from justifications in that they 
provide external factors responsible for the offence. In situation 5, the external factor 
leading up to the offence was the resemblance between the offended and the 
speaker’s friend: 
(79) ... Mnogo ličite na jednog mog prijatelja, pa sam hteo da se javim.         
(S-5/16) 
 (... You really look like my friend, so I wanted to say ‘hi’).  
(80) You remarkably look like my friend. (SLE-5/10) 
The most interesting data in situation 5 is the frequency of excuses occurring in the 
responses. Whereas in the Serbian data there were 14 occurrences, 7 in each group, 
the American data contained no instances of this apology strategy. Additionally, 
Serbian informants tended to produce responses consisting of the combination of 
excuses and justifications as illustrated in examples (81) and (82). However, example 
(83) shows a response by a speaker who produced only an excuse combined with a 
direct expression of apology. 
(81) ... ali sam bila ubeđena da si moj prijatelj, s leđa ste identični!! Izvini još 
jednom!! (S-5/11) 
(... but I was convinced that you were my friend, you look identical from 
behind!! I apologize again!!) 
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(82) I thought you were my friend. From the back you look the same.        
(SLE-5/5) 
(83) Izvinite, mnogo ličite na mog prijatelja. Izvinite još jednom! (S-5/20) 
(I apologize, you really look like my friend. I apologize again!) 
 
All three groups of speakers used the strategy acknowledgment of responsibility, 
which could be found in the speakers’ feeling of embarrassment (84). In some 
instances this strategy was used alone, without being accompanied by a direct 
expression of apology, as in example (85). 
(84) Oh, my God. This is so embarrassing. I thought you were somebody else. 
Pardon me! (SLE-5/19) 
 (85) Well. That was embarrassing. (E-5/17) 
 
According to the length of their responses, it can again be stated that Serbian 
speakers were more ready to communicate with strangers than the Americans. The 
responses were also longer due to their employment of excuses, as opposed to the 
American speakers, who did not include that strategy in their responses.  
As regards the function of excuses used in situation 5, it can be said that they serve 
as complements to justifications in order to make the non-intentionality of the offence 
more credible. When compared to situation 1 (dead fish), it is clear that the nature of 
excuses is not the same; they are used in situation 1 as an attempt to avoid 
responsibility, which cannot be said for excuses employed in situation 5. 
 
8.5.6 Situation 6 (ticket inspector) 
 
The offence described in situation 6 (ticket inspector) elicited the equal number of 
apology strategies from all three groups of speakers (see Table 14). Situation 6 also 
elicited the lowest number of strategies when compared to the other seven situations 
in the present DCT. As regards social variables, this scenario is based on high social 
distance and unequal social power (S<H). 
As table 15 illustrates, the frequency of direct apology strategies in situation 6 is 
rather low. Native English speakers have produced 6 direct apology strategies in 
their responses, all of which are expressions of regret. Non-native English speakers 
have produced 4 direct apology strategies, 2 of which are offers of apology, and 2 
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are expressions of regret. Informants responding in Serbian have used only 3 direct 
apologies in their responses, and all of them are offers of apology.  
 
 
Table 14 Distribution of strategies across language groups in situation 6 
SITUATION 6           ENGLISH         SERBIAN       SL ENGLISH 
 
Apology   6  3  4 
Acknowledge  –  2  1 
Admit facts   7  5  5 
Justification    11  15  14 
Excuse    –  1  1 
Repair   10  8  9 
Concern   –  –  – 
Forbearance   –  –  – 
Total no. of strategies 34  34  34 
Opt out   –  1  2 
 
 
 
Table 15 Frequencies of direct apology strategies in situation 6 
DIRECT APOLOGY STRATEGIES           NE          NS        SLE 
Expression of regret   6  –  2 
Offer of apology    –  3  2 
Request for forgiveness   –  –  – 
 
 
Instances of verbal denial could be found in responses offered by the speakers of 
both Serbian groups. They pretended to have purchased the ticket: 
 (86) ... samo da je pronađem u torbi. (S-6/12) 
 (... let me find it in by bag. ) 
(87) I’m trying to find it, it’s really difficult with big bag, so many things. I know 
that the ticket was here somewhere. (SLE-6/4) 
(88) Just a second, I got it here, it is somewhere in my purse. (SLE-6/14) 
Another strategy employed by these two groups of subjects, but avoided by the 
Americans, were excuses. Whereas the response in Serbian implies that the ticket 
has been purchased (89), the response in English contains the speaker’s admission 
of the lack of the ticket (90). 
 (89) Karta mi je ostala kod drugarice, a ona je otišla u wc. (S-6/15) 
(My friend has my ticket, and she has gone to the toilet.) 
 (90) ... the machine on the platform where I got in was broken. (SLE-6/9) 
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Admissions of fact were rather popular with the speakers, though slightly more with 
the Americans.  
 (91) I...don’t have it. (E-6/8) 
 (92) Madam, I do not have a ticket, neither some money to buy it. (SLE-6/2) 
Offer of repair is a strategy with a relatively high number of occurrences in all three 
groups’ responses. 
(93) ... Can I give you my name and address and pay as soon as I get some 
money? (E-6/9) 
(94) I’ll call my friend to wait for me at the end stop and give me the money for 
the ticket? Is this ok with you? (SLE-6/15) 
All respondents employed justifications frequently. They either claimed to have 
forgotten the ticket at home or lost it (95), or they adhered to the information in the 
description of the situation (96), (97): 
(95) Oh no! I’m afraid I dropped it while I was rushing down the platform.      
(E-6/18) 
(96) ... uletela sam u voz u poslednjem trenutku. (S-6/2) 
(...I’ve run into the train in the last moment.) 
(97) I didn’t have time to buy the ticket. ... (SLE-6/20) 
Acknowledgement of responsibility occurred in responses offered in Serbian and 
non-native English. This strategy was found in long replies which consisted of several 
strategies combined, and it expressed how the speaker felt in the given situation. 
 (98) Zaista mi je neprijatno! ... (S-6/20) 
(I feel really embarrassed! ...) 
 (99) ... How embarrassing! (SLE-6/5) 
Although many speakers tried to avoid penalty by making up justifications and 
excuses, there were others who provided justifications consistent with the description 
of the situation. These justifications could be considered as the admission of truth. 
Therefore, the most face-threatening approach in this situation were responses 
combined of this type of justification and the admission of facts, as in example (100): 
(100) I wasn’t on time at the station and I didn’t have time to buy one, 
otherwise I would’ve miss the train. (SLE-6/3) 
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8.5.7 Situation 7 (landlady) 
 
Table 16 gives the total number of apology strategies in situation 7 (landlady). 
Serbian learners of English had the highest number of strategies – 57 against 54 for 
native English speakers and 51 for native Serbian speakers. As illustrated, all three 
groups mainly offered direct apologies, justified their behaviour and offered to repair 
the damage. 
 
 
Table 16 Distribution of strategies across language groups in situation 7 
SITUATION 7           ENGLISH         SERBIAN       SL ENGLISH 
 
Apology   19  18  16 
Acknowledge  1  4  3 
Admit facts   2  5  5 
Justification    4  7  10 
Excuse    –  –  – 
Repair   18  14  15 
Concern   –  –  – 
Forbearance   10  4  8 
Total no. of strategies 54  52  57 
Opt out   1  3  1 
 
 
As illustrated in Table 17, the routine formula I’m sorry is again by far the most 
frequently used form by native and non-native speakers of English. Native English 
speakers employed the expression of regret to the exclusion of other strategies, 
while in responses offered by Serbian learners of English offer of apology and 
request for forgiveness occurred once. Native Serbian speakers used offer of 
apology most of the time. 
 
Table 17 Frequencies of direct apology strategies in situation 7 
DIRECT APOLOGY STRATEGIES           NE          NS        SLE 
Expression of regret   19  1  14 
Offer of apology    –  16  1 
Request for forgiveness   –  1  1 
 
 
Situation 7 elicited a few instances of the category of opting out. Speakers tried to 
deny responsibility by shifting the blame to someone else, or pretending to know 
nothing about it: 
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 (101) Oh wow... Are you sure that was us? ... (E-7/3) 
 (102) Strašno! Ko zna ko sve dolazi ovde. ... (S-7/10) 
(That’s terrible! Who knows what kind of people come here. ...) 
The two Serbian groups accepted the blame for loud music, but denied responsibility 
for the dirty staircase: 
 (102) ... Prljavo stepenište može biti zbog svakoga! (S-7/19) 
(... Anyone could be responsible for the dirty staircase!) 
(103) ... concerning the dirty staircase, I don’t think any of my guests is 
responsible for that. (SLE-7/11) 
Admission of facts appeared five times in both Serbian groups’ responses, whereas 
the Americans used it only twice: 
(104) ... bila je žurka pa smo bili malo glasniji. ... (S-7/2) 
(I I had a party, and we were a bit louder. ... ) 
(105) Yes, I know that my guests were very loud ... (SLE-7/2) 
 
Realization of justifications was most frequent in non-native English responses. It 
occurred 10 times, as opposed to 7 in Serbian responses and only 4 in native 
English. The arguments mostly consisted in naming an occasion for the party (106), 
(107), or in claiming the non-awareness (108): 
 (106) ... bio mi je rođendan, pa smo slavili. ... (S-7/12) 
(... it was my birthday, so we celebrated. ...) 
 (107) ... But you see, it was my birthday party. ... (SLE-7/12) 
(108) If I’d known it was bothering you, I’d have gotten them to be quiet.       
(E-7/5) 
Informants in both Serbian groups were more ready to acknowledge responsibility 
than the American subjects. The reason for avoiding that strategy may be the face-
threat inherent in its realization. 
 (109) ... u pravu ste, stepenište je zaista prljavo. ... (S-7/5) 
(... you are right, the staircase is really dirty. ...) 
(110) You are right, the party was a bit louder than it should have been. ... 
(SLE-7/15) 
Offer of repair is the second most frequently used strategy, after the direct 
expression of apology. It occurred in 18 American responses out of 20 observed. The 
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two Serbian groups of respondents employed a slightly lower number of repairs – 15 
offered in English and 14 in Serbian.  
Situation 7 elicited the highest number of promises of forbearance. In the American 
data this strategy occurred 10 times, whereas in responses offered in Serbian it was 
found only 4 times. Serbian learners of English employed the strategy twice as often 
as compared to the other Serbian group of speakers. 
(111) ... I’ll clean the staircase immediately, and I won’t give you any more 
reason to complain about the noise. (E-7/6) 
(112) I’m really sorry, but it won’t happen again. I’ll take care of the stairs and 
try not to be that loud any more. (SLE-7/13) 
  
8.5.8 Situation 8 (security guard) 
 
The distribution of apology strategies in situation 8 (security guard) shows strong 
agreement among all three groups of speakers. The majority of respondents used a 
combination of strategies, which resulted in a rather high number of strategies 
employed in this situation, as illustrated in Table 18. 
 
 
Table 18 Distribution of strategies across language groups in situation 8 
SITUATION 8           ENGLISH         SERBIAN       SL ENGLISH 
 
Apology   14  18  16 
Acknowledge  9  7  10 
Admit facts   1  –  – 
Justification    16  17  20 
Excuse    6  –  1 
Repair   11  14  9 
Concern   –  –  – 
Forbearance   –  –  – 
Total no. of strategies 57  56  56 
Opt out   –  –  – 
 
 
The lowest frequency of direct apologies was found in the American data. The 
American speakers used the expression of regret with no exceptions, whereas the 
informants responding in Serbian exclusively used offers of apology. Non-native 
English speakers employed the same category as the Americans with one exception 
being a request for forgiveness. 
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Table 19 Frequencies of direct apology strategies in situation 8 
DIRECT APOLOGY STRATEGIES           NE          NS        NNE 
Expression of regret   14  –  15 
Offer of apology    –  18  – 
Request for forgiveness   –  –  1 
 
 
The most frequently used indirect apology strategy in situation 8 was justification. 
The arguments used by the respondents derived mostly from the description of the 
situation. The informants claimed that they were engaged in a conversation, didn’t 
realize and forgot. Native and non-native speakers produced very similar arguments 
(113), (114). 
 (113) I’m so sorry, I didn’t even realize I still had it in my hand. ... (E-8/7) 
(114) I’m really sorry, but I left the shop without noticing that I have the CD in 
my hand. ... (SLE-8/13) 
 (115) Izvinjavam se! Zapričala sam se s prijateljicom ... (S-8/8) 
(I apologize! I was chatting away with a friend ...) 
One more way the speakers attempted to justify their behaviour and emphasize lack 
of intent was providing logical proof. These examples were found in non-native 
English data: 
(116) Sorry sir, I was so caught up in a conversation with my friend that I 
completely forgot I was holding the CD in my hands, you can’t possibly 
think I wanted to steal it, I would’ve at the very least put it in my bag. 
(SLE-8/8) 
(117) I’ve completely forgotten that I haven’t paid for the CD...come on do you 
really believe that I’m so stupid to do such a thing when I’m aware that 
the alarm would go off! (SLE-8/19) 
Excuses occurred 6 times in native English responses and only once in non-native 
English data, while in the responses in Serbian this strategy was avoided. 
(118) ... I honestly wasn't going to take it, I don't shoplift. Sorry again, I was too 
distracted. (E-8/20) 
 (119) ... It was accidentally, I was distracted, sorry! (SLE-8/14) 
Acknowledgement of responsibility in the form of explicit acceptance of guilt was 
mostly avoided in situation 8. The expressions containing the high degree of face-
threat which were used in responses were lack of intent and expressions of 
embarrassment.  
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 (120) Oh Wow! My bad. ... This is so embarrassing. (E-8/3) 
(121) Ja sam idiot!! Izvinite ... Nije mi namera bila da ukradem CD. ...           
(S-8/13) 
(I’m an idiot!! I apologize ... I didn’t intend to steal the CD. ...) 
 (122) This is so embarrassing. I didn’t intend to steal it ... (SLE-8/7) 
In situation 8, the use of only one category such as lack of intent or self-criticism may 
appear insufficient as an attempt to justify the nature of event. For this reason many 
speakers used a combination of several apology strategies: 
(123) It is me, isn’t it? I’m so sorry, I forgot I was still holding it. I did mean to 
buy it and then I was distracted. Please, may I go and pay now?          
(E-8/12) 
(124) I completely forgot I was holding a CD in my hand. I didn’t mean to go 
without paying, please forgive me. I will pay for it instantly! (SLE-8/16) 
Situations such as 8 (security guard) and 6 (ticket inspector) involve offences which 
may lead to far-reaching consequences for the offender. Therefore, the choice of 
employed strategies depends very much on the speaker’s awareness of the severity 
of his/her offence. 
 
8.6 Apology modifiers 
 
Direct apologies are speech acts which are often considered to be routinised 
formulas (Ogiermann 2009: 121). Moreover, it is sometimes difficult to differentiate 
between a ritual and a sincere apology. In cases when a speaker believes that 
his/her direct apology strategy might not seem sincere enough, he/she may decide to 
use modifiers in order to intensify the apology. 
In the present study, the frequencies of native and non-native English internal 
intensifiers are comparable. They amount to 60 in native English responses and 66 in 
non-native English responses. Native Serbian responses include only 29 internal 
intensifiers. 
The most frequently used adverbial intensifiers in the American data were so and 
really. The intensifier terribly appeared only twice. Since the American informants 
used the expression of regret almost exclusively, they combined the three adverbs 
with this strategy.  
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Native Serbian speakers intensified the offer of apology izvini-te mostly with molim 
te/molim Vas (please, lit. I beg). The same form of intensifier co-occurred with the 
request for forgiveness oprosti-te. The expression of regret was used with several 
adverbial intensifiers: stvarno (really), mnogo (very much), zaista (really).  
The most popular adverbial intensifier among Serbian learners of English was the 
adverb so, followed by really, very, terribly and truly. All of them co-occurred with the 
expression of regret. There were also several instances of a combination of adverbs 
such as so terribly, really truly, so very, which were not present in the American data. 
The requests for forgiveness excuse me and forgive me were usually accompanied 
by the intensifier please which also appeared together with the offer of apology (125): 
 (125) Please accept my apology for the inconvenience. ... (SLE-1/10) 
Serbian learners of English often repeated the expression of regret combining it with 
(once) again (126): 
 (126) I’m sorry, I thought it was someone else! Sorry again! (SLE-5/17) 
As regards external modifiers, the most frequent form were exclamations. They were 
employed by all three groups of speakers, amounting to 52 instances in native 
English responses, 48 in non-native Serbian responses, and 46 in native Serbian 
responses. American informants used the following forms: oh, oh no, oh whoops, 
oops, oh my god, shit, ugh no, ups. Responses in Serbian contained the following 
exclamations: jao, joj, o, u, uf, uh, ups. Serbian learners of English employed 
expressions very similar to those used by the American respondents: oh, oh dear 
Lord, oh my God, oh no, goodness, oh shit, oops, ups. These exclamations were 
mostly used in situation 3 (heavy door), situation 5 (mistaking a stranger) and 
situation 8 (security guard) in all three data. 
Even though exclamations can be regarded culture-specific, their frequencies in all 
three groups are rather comparable. 
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8.7 Discussion 
 
When performing an apology, second language learners have to be able to first 
recognize a situation which calls for an apology, to take into account variables such 
as social distance and social power, and to select the appropriate strategy. 
The findings of the present study show that there are not many differences between 
native English speakers and Serbian learners of English with regard to the direct 
apology strategies. This result could be expected given the non-natives’ generally 
advanced level of English.  
The only significant difference could be noticed in situation 4 (DVDs) where the 
Americans employed 18 direct apologies as opposed to 10 occurrences in non-native 
responses. The number of direct apology strategies in native Serbian responses was 
also lower than in native English responses. As situation 4 is based on low social 
distance and equal social power it may be the case that the two Serbian groups of 
speakers did not consider it as important to apologize to a friend as much as the 
Americans did. Another assumption could be that the Americans perceived the 
offence more severe than the Serbian speakers. 
As regards direct apology categories, it has already been mentioned that the 
expression of regret was the preferred direct form by the Americans and Serbian 
learners of English, whereas in Serbian responses the most frequent form was the 
offer of apology (see section 8.5.1). It is clear from this that the concept of 
apologizing in these two languages is culture-specific. However, although Serbian 
learners of English mostly employed the expression of regret, they were not so 
exclusive in their choice of direct strategies as the American speakers. Specifically, in 
situation 3 (heavy door) and situation 5 (mistaking a stranger) the responses made 
by Serbian learners of English included several instances of offer of apology and 
request for forgiveness, which could also be found in native Serbian responses, 
whereas the American informants adhered to the expression of regret. Additionally, 
requests for forgiveness were very rarely used by both groups of Serbian informants 
in situations based on low social distance. These facts imply that this category is 
considered more formal than other explicit apology categories in Serbian culture. 
Using requests for forgiveness in situations where the Americans did not use them, 
Serbian learners of English may have provided instances of socio-cultural transfer 
from their L1 to their L2. 
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Ogiermann (2009: 126) argues that the request for forgiveness and the expression of 
regret vary greatly in the degree to which they are face-threatening. While the former 
threatens hearer’s negative face involving him/her in the process of forgiving, the 
latter implies a lower degree of imposition for both the speaker and the hearer and is 
considered a less direct category. It cannot be claimed with certainty to what extent 
speakers are aware of the semantic implications of the explicit apology strategies 
which they use. However, considering the relatively high frequency of intensifiers 
combined with the expression of regret in both native and non-native English 
responses, speakers of English seem to be aware that the expression of regret can 
be considered a relatively weak and routinised formula. In contrast, the much lower 
degree of intensification in Serbian responses may be related to the higher degree of 
imposition on the speaker and the hearer implicit in the offer of apology, which was 
the most frequent category in the native Serbian data. 
The results show that overall Serbian native speakers resorted to justifications more 
often than the Americans. The language learner data reveal that the frequency of this 
strategy is more similar to the native Serbian data than to the native English data in 
all situations. As regards the excuse strategy, the data show similar results. 
Significant differences were found in situation 5 (mistaking a stranger) where both 
native Serbian speakers and Serbian learners of English felt bound to offer excuses 
to the offended, producing an equal number of this strategy, as opposed to the 
Americans, whose responses did not include excuses at all. Situation 8 (security 
guard) elicited excuses in the American data, whereas in responses offered by both 
groups of Serbian informants this strategy was not present. Therefore, as regards 
excuses and justifications, it seems that Serbian learners of English adhered to their 
native socio-cultural norms when employing these strategies. 
An interesting observation could be made with regard to the length of responses. 
Especially in situations where the offender apologized to a stranger (situation 3 and 
situation 5) the responses made by both Serbian native speakers and Serbian 
learners of English were considerably longer than the responses offered by the 
American group of informants. In scenario 3 (heavy door) the data show that both 
groups of Serbian informants provided significantly more apology strategies than 
native American speakers. They felt the necessity to justify their behaviour much 
more, acknowledged responsibility more often, and offered to repair the damage 
unlike the native English group of speakers. While Serbian respondents recognized 
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the need to name numerous mitigating circumstances, American informants offered 
an absolute minimum of information necessary in the given situation, which would 
probably be considered as insufficient from the point of view of the Serbian speakers. 
The use of positive politeness strategies (offer of repair, concern for hearer, and 
promise of forbearance) showed little difference between native and non-native 
speakers. The only noticeable difference was found in situation 2 (professor’s book) 
where an offer of repair was employed twice as often by native speakers of English 
as compared to non-native speakers, as well as the Serbian native speakers. It may 
be the case that the Serbian groups of informants regarded the infraction less severe 
than the American group, which then resulted in lower number of repair strategy 
supplied by the two Serbian groups. This could be another instance of learners’ 
adhering to their native socio-cultural norms. 
Finally, the results indicate that Serbian learners of English conformed to English 
native speaker norms as regards apology modifiers. They produced an almost equal 
number of intensifiers as the Americans, and a significantly lower number than 
Serbian native speakers.  
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9 Conclusion 
 
The present study has investigated apology, a speech act which involves politeness 
to a significant extent. Its purpose was to obtain a description of how apologies are 
realized by Serbian learners of English, and to understand the nature and extent of 
possible gaps between native and non-native English apologies. The results show 
that, for the most part, the non-natives used the same semantic formulas as native 
English speakers. However, some instances could be found where the non-natives 
did not use all the expected formulas. According to the data, the cases where non-
native speaker performance deviated from the native speaker norms occurred mainly 
as a result of the influence of the learners’ native language patterns. The findings, 
therefore, suggest that the linguistic choices made by Serbian learners of English are 
to some degree dependent of their cultural background. 
Lack of pragmatic competence, as well as negative pragmatic transfer, has been 
considered the primary source of miscommunication in interactions. Different cultures 
have different sets of linguistic and social rules and norms, and if a speaker does not 
possess the necessary knowledge of them, he/she may not be able to express 
him/herself appropriately, and may misinterpret the intended pragmatic force of an 
utterance. In order to avoid unpleasant situations and unintended rude behaviour, 
many linguists argue that it is important to raise pragmatic awareness of students. 
Thomas (1983: 32) believes that the language teacher has the responsibility to point 
out to possible consequences of certain linguistic behaviour. Moreover, she stresses 
the importance of making foreign language speakers able to express themselves in 
the way they want to, and that is why pragmatic competence is such a significant 
factor in intercultural communication. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Questionnaire in English 
 
 
Instructions: 
 
Imagine yourself in the situations described below and assume that in each instance 
you will say something. Write down what you would say in the space provided. Try to 
react as spontaneously as possible and put your answer in direct speech. 
 
1. When going on holiday your friend gave you his flat keys and asked you to feed 
his fish. You have not always had the time and some of the fish have died. When 
you return the keys your friend asks what happened. 
 
2. Your friend had asked you to return some video tapes to her. You totally forgot 
and she has just received a call from the video shop, saying that the films are 
required by another customer and she owes a week’s fees. 
 
3. You see a friend of yours in the crowd, run up to him and hit him on the back. 
Only then you realize that it’s not your friend, but a complete stranger. 
 
4. When leaving a crowded shop you let go a heavy door and it hits a woman behind 
you. 
 
5. You have borrowed a book from a professor. Now you are supposed to give it 
back to him, but you cannot remember where you put it. 
 
6. You had a party at your flat. The next day you meet the landlady, who lives in the 
same house. She complains about the noise and the dirty staircase. 
 
7. You are at a shopping centre and having an interesting conversation with your 
friend. You are so engaged in it that you don’t realize that you are holding a CD in 
your hand that you were going to buy. You leave the shop and the alarm goes off. 
A security guy comes up to you. 
 
8. You are just in time to catch your train and have neither a ticket nor money with 
you. You have just taken a seat when the ticket inspector enters the 
compartment. She asks you for your ticket. 
 
Distractors: 
a. You got ill and cannot attend an important lecture. You ring up a fellow student to 
ask if you can copy his notes.  
b. You have lent a book to a friend of yours and she returns it in a bad condition. 
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Appendix B: Questionnaire in Serbian 
 
 
Zamisli sebe u sledećih deset situacija. Pretpostavi da bi u svakoj od njih nešto 
rekao/la. U predviđenom prostoru ispod svake situacije napiši šta bi izgovorio/la. 
Pažljivo pročitaj svaku situaciju pre nego što daš svoj odgovor. 
 
 
1. Kada je krenuo na odmor prijatelj ti je dao svoje ključeve od stana i zamolio te da 
hraniš njegove ribice. Ti nisi baš uvek imao/la vremena pa su neke ribice uginule. 
Sada vraćaš ključeve i prijatelj te pita šta se desilo. 
 
2. Prijateljica te je zamolila da vratiš neke diskove umesto nje. Ti si potpuno 
zaboravio/la na to i ona je upravo dobila poziv iz video kluba gde je obaveštavaju 
da kasni sa vraćanjem filmova i da će morati da plati prekoračenje. 
 
3. Slučajno si spazio/la svog prijatelja u gužvi, dotrčao/la si do njega i udario/la ga 
po leđima. U tom trenutku shvataš da to nije tvoj prijatelj već neko nepoznat. 
 
4. Izlaziš iz prodavnice prepune ljudi i iza sebe puštaš teška vrata koja slučajno 
udare ženu iza tebe. 
 
5. Pozajmio/la si knjigu od profesora. Treba da je vratiš ali ne možeš da se setiš gde 
si je stavio/la. 
 
6. Pravio/la si žurku u svom stanu. Sledećeg dana srećeš svoju gazdaricu koja živi u 
istoj kući i ona se žali na buku i prljavo stepenište. 
 
7. Nalaziš se u tržnom centru i razgovaraš sa svojom prijateljicom. Toliko ste se 
zapričali/le da i ne primećuješ da u ruci držiš CD koji si nameravao/la da kupiš. 
Izlaziš iz prodavnice i alarm počinje da pišti. Prilazi ti radnik obezbeđenja. 
 
8. Stižeš na voz tačno pred polazak ali nemaš ni kartu ni novac kod sebe. Tek što si 
zauzeo/la mesto, kondukterka ulazi u kupe. Traži da pokažeš svoju kartu. 
 
a. Razboleo/la si se i ne možeš da ideš na predavanje. Zoveš prijatelja da ga pitaš 
da ti pozajmi svoje beleške. 
b. Pozajmio/la si knjigu prijateljici i ona ti je vraća oštećenu. 
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Zusammenfassung  
 
Die Interlanguage-Pragmatik ist ein sprachlicher Bereich, der im Feld des 
Zweitspracherwerbs einzuordnen ist. Eines ihrer Ziele es, die Interpretation und 
Realisierung von Sprechakten einer Zweitsprache durch Nichtmuttersprachler zu 
untersuchen.  
Sprachenlernende müssen pragmatische Kompetenzen in ihrer Zweitsprache 
erwerben, um in der Lage sein zu können in dieser Sprache erfolgreich zu 
kommunizieren. Die Forschung in der Interlanguage-Pragmatik hat jedoch  gezeigt, 
dass soziolinguistische Kompetenz für die Lernenden problematisch sein kann. Sie 
können zwar in der Zweitsprache grammatikalisch kompetent sein, aber immer noch 
mangelnde Kenntnisse der soziolinguistischen Regeln haben, d.h. entsprechend zu 
kommunizieren und Sprache im Kontext zu verstehen. Da die erste und zweite 
Sprache der Lernenden in der Realisierungen von Sprechakten unterschiedlich sein 
kann, kann der Mangel am sprachlichen, sozialen und pragmatischen Wissen der 
Lernenden zu pragmatischen Fehlern führen. Eine mögliche Ursache für 
pragmatische Fehler ist der pragmatische Transfer, der bei einer inadäquaten 
Übertragung der gewohnten sprachlichen Kommunikationsmuster von der 
Muttersprache in die Zielsprache auftritt. Als Folge kann der Sprecher als  ungewollt 
unhöflich und respektlos erscheinen. 
Ein Sprechakt, in dem pragmatischer Transfer eventuell auftreten kann, ist die 
Entschuldigung. Sich in der Zweitsprache adäquat entschuldigen zu können ist ein 
wichtiger Teil der kommunikativen Kompetenz des Sprechers. Wenn soziale Normen 
verletzt werden und Missverständnisse auftreten, sind Entschuldigungen ein gutes 
Mittel dafür, sein Gesicht in der bedrohlichen Kommunikationssituation zu wahren (to 
save face). 
Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht den Sprechakt der Entschuldigung im Bezug auf 
die Phänomene der Höflichkeit und den pragmatischen Transfer. Ihr Zweck ist es zu 
beschreiben wie serbische Englischlernende sich auf Englisch entschuldigen und zu 
verstehen in wie fern sich diese Entschuldigungen von jenen englischer 
Muttersprachler unterscheiden. Die Ergebnisse der Studie zeigen, dass als direkte 
Entschuldigungsform der Ausdruck des Bedauerns die bevorzugte Art der 
Amerikaner und der serbischen Englischlernenden ist, während auf serbisch die 
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häufigste Reaktion das Angebot der Entschuldigung ist. Es ist ersichtlich, dass das 
Konzept der Entschuldigung in diesen beiden Sprachen kulturspezifisch ist. 
Außerdem zeigen die Daten, dass Formulierungen von Nichtmuttersprachlern, von  
muttersprachlichen Normen abweichen, da die Lernenden die Strukturen aus ihrer 
Muttersprache in die Zweitsprache übernehmen. Die Analyse der Ergebnisse lässt 
den Schluss zu, dass die sprachliche Auswahl von serbischen Englischlernenden zu 
einem gewissen Grad abhängig von ihrem kulturellen Hintergrund ist. 
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